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6Introduction
Introduction
Critical public debt levels have forced EU member states to pursue ﬁ scal consolidation. Yet, there 
is a ﬂ ip side to the austerity policies being administered to overcome the sovereign debt crisis. 
Cut backs in social transfers and public service delivery erode the social welfare architecture of 
the European economic model. Growing social insecurity, in turn, challenges European integra-
tion. Ever declining popular approval rates for the EU speak for themselves. In addition, the 
scaling back of public investments seems not to be an option either. This only further strangles 
what is left as potential for growth.
Given that ever less money is available, increasing the efﬁ ciency of public spending – one would 
think – becomes the order of the day. One possibility to achieve such efﬁ ciency gains is the appro-
priate allocation of spending across all levels of government. In the EU context, this would mean 
determining what governance level in the EU – Brussels or the member states – could do what 
best, and thus be in charge also in ﬁ scal terms. The assumption is that in certain areas where, 
for example, economies of scale come into play a “euro spent at the EU level brings more beneﬁ ts 
than if spent at the national or regional level,” as the European Commission puts it. 
It was the Commission that featured the concept of the European added value when it released 
its EU budget proposal for 2014 to 2020. According to the EC, added value “is best deﬁ ned as the 
value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would have been 
otherwise created by member states alone”. The Commission’s argument for reform of the EU 
budget did not fell on fertile soil with member states. During the budget negotiations, the ques-
tion of European added value played at best a tangential role. Instead, old-fashioned juste retour 
thinking prevailed. The ﬁ ght was, once again, over the size of the budget and the way in which 
appropriations are distributed. It was not about how the quality of the EU budget can be improved 
to the beneﬁ t of Europe’s citizens.
It may not come as a surprise to hard-nosed political warhorses that even in times of ﬁ scal crisis 
so little thought was given to a more rational assignment of ﬁ scal activities between the EU and 
its member states. For them, politics based on empirical evidence is as such a contradictio in 
adiecto. Unfortunately, thus far political reality offers ample proof that political and economic 
logic simply do not pair – at least not in budget negotiations. Nevertheless, these realists fall 
short when it comes to answering how politicians can continue to evade these economic choices, 
especially at times when neither their nation state nor the EU can deliver the public goods needed 
to protect citizens in a globalised world. 
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The following explorative study was initiated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Our intention was to 
underscore the European added value argument by putting a price tag on the savings and losses 
incurred by EU spending. In research hitherto carried out, European added value has largely 
been deﬁ ned on the basis of qualitative criteria. This made the concept fuzzy as it became pos-
sible to prove the added value of a European policy as well as the opposite. It was therefore our 
aim to operationalise the concept to be able to rigorously quantify European added value in the 
previously untested ﬁ elds of agricultural policy, foreign affairs, and defence. In an  empirical 
approach, we entered uncharted waters from the outset. But it seemed worth every effort to pres-
ent proof for the ﬁ rst time that the EU indeed can save its member states’ money.
The project was run in cooperation with the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), 
which worked on the conceptual framing and most of the data processing. Our case study on the 
added value of Common Agricultural Policy spending would never gotten as far as it did without 
the expertise and dedication of Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel from the University of Göttingen. 
Likewise, we would not have been able to calculate the potential cost savings of integrated land 
forces without RAND Europe joining our project team. In addition, from the beginning the proj-
ect was supported by a group of experts from academia and the policy arena. Their input, be it 
in paper form or during our four expert group meetings held in Brussels in 2011 and 2012, was 
invaluable in shaping our research and ensuring that our project’s output is of high quality and 
beneﬁ ting of policy experience. 
Stefani Weiss
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Executive Summary
Our research on European added value (EAV) has provided different types of insights. First of 
all, it demonstrates that more precision in the use and application of the highly popular term 
‘European added value’ is desirable. EAV can only be a helpful concept if it is consistently applied. 
A second insight is that, at least for speciﬁ c, well-deﬁ ned policy ﬁ elds, EAV quantiﬁ cations are 
indeed possible. While difﬁ cult and technically demanding, quantiﬁ cations of EAV are feasible 
and can provide important insight for policy debates.
This study has developed deﬁ nitions and concepts that might serve as a guideline for best prac-
tices in future EAV studies. The deﬁ nition of a counterfactual must be a deﬁ ning element for any 
meaningful approach. Real quantiﬁ cations of an ‘added’ value through EU involvement are only 
possible if the costs or the impact of EU spending can be compared to the costs or the impact 
of national spending (the national counterfactual, as presented in the case study on the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy). The reverse is also true: if spending is still mainly national and the 
potential of a stronger EU involvement has to be assessed there is the need to derive a European 
counterfactual with which the actual national policy could be compared (as done in the studies on 
international representations and defence). Our applications to three very different policy ﬁ elds 
have demonstrated that the identiﬁ cation of a national or European counterfactual is challeng-
ing and that no uniform prescription is possible. Possible approaches comprise the econometric 
estimation of spending models or the calculation of differentiated costing models. 
As for our speciﬁ c policy-related insights, this study ﬁ nds some evidence that ‘more Europe’ may 
indeed be in the interest of taxpayers in the ﬁ elds of international representations and defence. 
For these two ﬁ elds, we were able to indicate ranges of substantial potential cost savings through 
a European approach. However, for both we have revealed an important caveat that relates to 
wages. Whenever a European approach implies that today’s salary levels of EU civil servants 
would replace national payment schemes, the potential of cost savings declines or disappears 
completely. 
With respect to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the study was not able to substantiate one 
speciﬁ c type of added value, namely that through centralisation of agricultural policy at the EU 
level, the EU contains wasteful subsidy races in the area of agriculture between member states. 
In particular, the study does not ﬁ nd that the CAP has greatly increased or reduced public expen-
diture on agriculture compared to the national agricultural policies that would have replaced it.
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What is European added value?
From an economic point of view, public spending at the European level ideally fulﬁ ls two criteria. For 
one, it should entail positive net beneﬁ ts, i.e. the beneﬁ ts should exceed the costs of public spending. 
Second, it should entail European added value (EAV) of public spending, i.e. the net beneﬁ ts of public 
spending at the European level should be larger than those at the national level. In other words, EAV 
essentially compares the net beneﬁ ts of spending by national governments with those that arise from 
spending in the same category at the European level. In this sense, added value is technically the 
difference between the net beneﬁ ts of spending at the EU level and the national level. It is important 
to note that the magnitude of net beneﬁ ts and EAV are not conceptually connected. For instance, 
even if net beneﬁ ts are negative, provision at the EU level may still be advantageous. 
Many public services entail signiﬁ cant crossborder beneﬁ t spillovers that imply that individual 
member states underprovide them. One of the most important policy ﬁ elds to which this argu-
ment applies is the support of trans-European transport networks. In addition, the EU may be 
better placed to exploit economies of scale that result in EAV. Economies of scale arise because 
public services are, at least to some extent, non-rival in consumption. Given that the EU provides 
public services to a larger number of beneﬁ ciaries than national governments, the per capita 
costs of provision decline. Not least, large-scale public projects with high ﬁ xed costs involve 
funding that exceeds the ﬁ nancial capacity of individual states. In other words, various public 
services are subject to threshold effects implying that only jurisdictions that exceed a certain 
size are able to provide them. In such a case, only the EU is able to provide them, thus resulting 
in EAV. These threshold effects are essentially an extreme type of economies of scale. A potential 
example of a public good that might be subject to such threshold effects is GALILEO, although the 
net beneﬁ ts of this project are contested. 
Other reasons why spending at the EU level may involve added value relate to causes associ-
ated with political economy and governance. Public spending at the European level potentially 
adds value by limiting wasteful competition between national governments. Subsidies paid by 
national governments to particular industries or sectors may result in a ‘subsidy race to the top’ 
where governments try to always pay more than their peers in order to attract mobile ﬁ rms 
(in analogy to the case of tax competition). Paying subsidies exclusively at the European level 
thereby creates EAV because this type of competition is likely to be contained. This argument 
may in principle apply to agricultural policy. On top of this, national governments tend to be 
short-sighted because of relatively short electoral cycles. By contrast, policy-making and hence 
public-spending decisions at the European level are partially decoupled from national electoral 
cycles. This in turn allows public spending allocation and composition in certain sectors to be 
potentially more focused on long-run objectives, such as economic growth which creates EAV 
through the improved allocation of resources. 
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Case study 1
Does the CAP cap agricultural spending in the EU? 
On the EAV of agricultural policy
One clear result emerges from the analysis. Overall we do not ﬁ nd that the CAP has greatly 
increased or reduced public expenditure on agriculture compared with the national agricultural 
policies that would have replaced it between 2004 and 2010, which is the period under consider-
ation. However there is some indication that in recent years the CAP has begun to cap expenditure 
on agricultural policy. National agricultural policies would have cost roughly Euro 23 billion 
more in 2010 than was spent on the CAP in that year. While the common pool problem may 
have inﬂ ated spending on agriculture in the early decades of the CAP, budget ceilings and the 
growing importance of policy areas other than agriculture in the EU may be helping agricultural 
policy makers to resist pressures for more protection and support at the national level.
To put these results in perspective, several additional points should be made. First, our simula-
tions are subject to uncertainty, and the conﬁ dence intervals of our simulated EU-21 national 
agricultural policies (NAP) expenditures are wide, which means that these expenditures could 
be considerably higher or lower. Second, the model that we use to simulate NAP expenditures 
is subject to the weaknesses that are associated with all such models. In particular, while it is 
able to explain a large portion of the observed variation in agricultural policy spending over 
time and across non-EU OECD countries, it does not explain all of this variation. Third, the ﬁ nd-
ing that the CAP may be curbing public expenditure on agricultural support in recent years 
does not necessarily mean that the CAP produces EAV. There is some indication that the CAP 
is producing one speciﬁ c type of EAV that is sometimes attributed to it: policy coordination 
that reduces political-economic distortions and limits subsidy races. However, our ﬁ ndings 
do not generate insights into whether the CAP provides other types of EAV. Defenders of the 
CAP will argue that it also generates a range of public goods that national policies would not 
generate. However, critics can point to a variety of public bads and inefﬁ ciencies, and argue 
that the same money could generate much more EAV if it were spent on areas such as research 
and infrastructure development. 
One explanation for this ongoing controversy is that it is highly complicated to prove the exis-
tence of EAV for the CAP. Whether CAP expenditure generates EAV is not just a question of 
the size of the beneﬁ ts and costs (even if these could be quantiﬁ ed). In the absence of a com-
mon agricultural policy, the member states would implement NAP instead. These would also 
produce costs and beneﬁ ts. The CAP generates EAV only if it generates net beneﬁ ts above and 
beyond those that would result from the implementation of NAP. Hence, to determine whether 
the CAP generates EAV one would not only have to measure all of its costs and beneﬁ ts. One 
would also have to predict what agricultural policies the member states would implement in 
the absence of the CAP, and estimate the costs and beneﬁ ts that these national policies would 
11
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produce. If anything, this second task of generating what is referred to as a ‘counterfactual’ is 
even more daunting than the ﬁ rst. 
Case study 2
One embassy with 27 flags – the potential benefits 
from European international representations 
The results indicate the existence of potentially signiﬁ cant savings ranging from Euro 420 mil-
lion to Euro 1.3 billion annually, which, in relative terms, represents between 6 percent and 19 
percent of current spending of all EU member states. In other words, EAV in the area of European 
international representations is signiﬁ cant. One important caveat relates, however, to the payment 
structure. This EAV quantiﬁ cation is based on the assumption that national wage levels would 
also persist in comprehensive EU missions. Thus, the results are invalid if for the EU missions EU 
salaries become relevant.
Foreign policy is the textbook case for a typical national public good in federal countries. There-
fore, it does not come as a surprise that foreign policy plays a role wherever ﬁ scal federalism 
approaches are applied to the EU and its budget. It appears straightforward that Europe could 
realize considerable economies of scale if it assigns foreign policy-related tasks to the European 
level, for instance, by slashing the number of diplomatic missions abroad including the size of 
staff. Uncoordinated national activities are confronted with numerous spillover problems which 
may result in freeriding and the suboptimal provision of international activities. Smaller coun-
tries may rely on the consular services of larger countries’ representations. A national planning 
of geographical coverage of the missions’ network may lead to inefﬁ cient regional clusters. 
Thus, a European approach would create considerable EAV. It is therefore not surprising that 
foreign policy is regularly emphasized as one of the priorities for future reallocations in the 
European budget. However, plausible textbook cases often do not stand the challenges of a prac-
tical application. And the obvious problem with the Europeanization of foreign policy is the 
undeniable existence of national interests in foreign affairs. The trade-off between creating 
EAV and limiting national sovereignty poses problems for any attempt of quantiﬁ cation EAV 
such attempts. Even if the potential cost savings from a far-reaching transfer of foreign policy 
competencies to the European level could be calculated, any such result would not be taken 
seriously in the political debate. Therefore, meaningful quantiﬁ cations must take account of 
the fact that certain dimensions of international relations will remain a national activity for the 
foreseeable future. And, if possible, quantiﬁ cations should provide a range of potential costs 
savings conditional on different options of Europeanization. In this case study, we concentrate 
on the provision of international representations covering embassies and consulates.
12
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Under a naïve approach, one could now simply compare the expenditures of the current dip-
lomatic missions of EU countries to the costs of a mutualized diplomatic service. Since the 
expenditures of the counterfactual situation cannot be derived directly, however, a more com-
plex scenario has to be applied. This study’s approach to quantify EAV is differentiated along 
two lines:
1) It analyses the potential EAV from a European provision both at the output and the cost side. 
A network of diplomatic missions could offer European citizens more complete worldwide 
coverage than any single member state could offer. At the same time, these beneﬁ ts could 
be achieved at lower costs as there are substantial economies of scale. 
2) It calculates the potential EAV for different scenarios with respect to a European provision 
of diplomatic services. In this calculation, we account for the fact that an EU mission would 
be confronted with some cost-driving elements compared to a mission of a large nation 
which result, inter alia, from language complications or certain special national interests. 
Thus we model different degrees of Europeanization across a typical mission’s functions. 
For example, our analysis assumes that it is easy to exploit economies of scale in the con-
sular services but less so for economic relations where special national interests are more 
prominent.
Case study 3
The fiscal added value of integrated 
European land forces 
The analysis shows that there is potential for signiﬁ cant added value from smaller, more coordinated 
European land forces. In monetary terms, the opportunity for savings is estimated at between 
Euro 3 billion and Euro 9 billion a year. Under the ‘medium’ scenario in this analysis, Europe’s 
27 would in the future have a total of 600,000 land force soldiers, compared with 890,000 land force 
soldiers today. This would be a signiﬁ cant but realistic reduction in personnel numbers – approxi-
mately one-third. This is analogous to the British Army’s re-sizing of regular manning levels, from 
110,000 in 2011 to 82,000 by 2020, which amounts to a reduction in size of almost 30 percent. 
The beneﬁ t to European member states of consolidating their land forces to 600,000 would 
be approximately Euro 6.5 billion a year. However, the crucial caveat emerging from our wage-
dependent simulations is that there is no convergence of wages to the top. If this were the case, the 
cost advantage of European land forces would quickly turn into a cost disadvantage. Assuming 
a continuation of today’s wage structure, this is a conservative estimate of the savings poten-
tial since we have not attempted to quantify likely cost savings in other lines of development, 
which would follow from a smaller total of military personnel. It could be reasonably expected 
13
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that expenditure related to basing, training and routine consumables would decline in line with 
personnel numbers. There would be additional savings in personnel costs from reduced pension 
and beneﬁ t payments that are not included in our calculations. Finally, this study only considers a 
consolidation of regular soldiers and does not assume any reduction in the number of gendarmerie 
and conscription soldiers, which together total a further 570,000 troops. 
In mature nation states, defence is undisputedly provided by the central government. In federal 
states like the US, Canada, Switzerland and Germany, this sole responsibility for the armed 
forces is more than accidental historical heritage: There is a convincing efﬁ ciency argument 
that the sub-national provision of defence would be needlessly expensive and to the detriment 
of a high quality service. In addition, freerider problems would pose numerous disincentives 
to efﬁ cient security provision. 
There is thus a straightforward case for considering the future possibility of defence policy 
at the EU level which would create substantial EAV by providing the same level of security at 
a lower cost, or even by improving the quality and (global) impact of European defence while 
avoiding a larger ﬁ scal burden. Of course, national sensitivities present a substantial obstacle 
to a centralised European defence. For many states, autonomous command over a national 
army, air force and navy is still a symbol of national sovereignty. Under the current regime 
of imperfect European defence integration, however, this symbolism has become costly and 
detrimental to the global effectiveness of EU member states’ defence activities.
With European member states in the grip of ﬁ scal austerity, there is fresh impetus behind 
efforts to improve the efﬁ ciency of defence in Europe. Many of these efforts focus on the pool-
ing and sharing of equipment between member states, with the aim of exploiting economies 
of scale and scope. By comparison, relatively little analysis has been dedicated to assessing 
potential beneﬁ ts from reducing inefﬁ ciencies related to the number of military personnel in 
Europe. Our research addresses this gap, estimating the potential added value of reforming the 
provision of personnel in one well-deﬁ ned military sector: European land forces. Speciﬁ cally, 
this study provides a range of estimates for the savings potential and thereby the EAV associ-
ated with integrated EU land forces. This enables us to offer a quantiﬁ cation of the opportunity 
costs implied by a continuation of the current national approach.
The study is designed to offer a range of estimates for the savings potential of a more integrated 
approach. It proceeds in two steps: 
1) We estimate the number of soldiers needed for Europe to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal 
2010, which establishes member states’ levels of ambition to fulﬁ ll the set of military tasks 
delineated by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. We compare that number to the number of 
soldiers that exist in Europe today. A clear challenge with this approach is that there is no 
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single, irrefutable ‘right size’ of land forces in Europe. A greater number of soldiers may 
yield higher levels of military capability, but these beneﬁ ts come with associated costs. This 
analysis aims to quantify the cost of carrying a number of soldiers over and above the level 
required to attain a ﬁ xed (and politically agreed) level of ‘beneﬁ t’ – or military capability. In 
this ﬁ rst step, we also investigate possible economies of scale from a large integrated army 
which may arise from an improved deployability ratio (the ‘tooth-to-tail ratio’). 
2) We cost the (smaller) number of soldiers required under a more coordinated set of European 
land forces. This takes account of detailed wage information of different national armies and 
is based on varying assumptions with respect to the wage structure in a European army, as 
compared to the current coexistence of national armies with their individual wage structure. 
Here, we were able to gather publicly available wage data for six member states in different 
income classes. This gives us a sound anchor for quantifying military wage levels for the 
remaining countries. Through this reﬁ ned approach, this study takes account of countervail-
ing forces, considering possible cost savings from a smaller number of soldiers as well as 
possible cost pushes through wage equalization above the current mean income. 
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European Added Value – Conceptual Framework
Friedrich Heinemann, Florian Misch, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, Steffen Osterloh, Stefani Weiss
European added value has become a key compass of EU spending. However its use and application 
still lack a consistent analytical base. This chapter proposes a conceptualization that could pave the 
way for meaningful quantiﬁ cations. Key is the distinction between net beneﬁ t and the added value 
of EU spending. In addition, the central challenge of such an empirical study is substantiating the 
added value of EU spending, namely identifying suitable national comparisons as points of reference. 
Judging by the number of times the term ‘European added value’ appears in ofﬁ cial documents in 
the context of the EU budget, it has advanced to become a critical determinant of EU spending.1 
It is used 32 times in the Communication on the Multiannual Financial Framework (2014 – 2020), 
while the term was used only twice in the Communication on the Delors I Package (1988 – 1992) 
and only once in the Communication on the Delors II Package (1993 – 1999). However, at present 
the deﬁ nitions of the term ‘added value’ and the way it is quantiﬁ ed differ widely (see Rubio 2011). 
The European Commission (European Commission 2011:1) deﬁ nes the European added value of 
public spending as “the value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value 
that would have been otherwise created by member state action alone”. This is the deﬁ nition we 
use.2 However, according to Rubio (2011), there are at least three other ways of using value added. 
One is when value added is interpreted as the beneﬁ ts that are derived from good management 
and implementation of EU policy programs (i.e. an ex post assessment of whether particular EU 
programs deliver the most possible added value). The second is when value added refers to a 
comparison of spending in particular policy areas (i.e. an identiﬁ cation of opportunity costs in 
line with an improved justiﬁ cation of EU spending). As for the third, value added can refer to the 
unexpected side-effects of EU interventions (i.e. the beneﬁ ts in addition to the achievement of the 
primary program-targets). 
European Added 
Value: A Proposal 
for Clarification
1  In line with other papers, the terms ‘European value added’ and ’European added value’ are used interchangeably. Even when ‘European’ is omitted, the 
term refers to the benefits of public spending at the EU level relative to those incurred at the national level. 
2  The European Commission released a working paper accompanying the Commission’s proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, A Budget 
for Europe 2020.
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For the last case, examples are improvements in the quality of the delivery system, or as Rubio puts 
it: “operational added value or enhanced visibility of the EU as well as increased support for the 
European integration project that provides ‘political added value’” (Rubio 2011:5).3
Some examples serve to illustrate this diversity. For instance, the Committee of the Regions (2008:3) 
sees value added as “the opportunities it offers Europeans to develop their full potential as indi-
viduals beyond national borders”. By contrast Eurostep (2008:4), which is a network of autonomous 
European development-related NGOs, states that the added value of various policies with respect 
to the internal market, agriculture, and energy “lies in ensuring that these policies do not impact 
negatively on developing countries”. The Advisory Committee of the EC on Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men (Aceceo 2008:11) claims that it is nearly “self-explanatory that there is a speciﬁ c 
EU added value in implementing gender budgeting at the European level”.
Equally, approaches to identify those public spending categories are either based on qualitative 
criteria, or use rather crude or ad-hoc reasoning for quantiﬁ cation that lacks a credible statistical 
foundation. Yet, understanding the meaning and potential magnitude of added value of public 
spending at the EU level is critical. Most importantly, from an economic perspective distributing 
spending assignments between the national and EU levels based on a robust assessment of value 
added of different public spending categories potentially enhances overall economic efﬁ ciency of 
the European economy. 
There are two ways to express an increase in efﬁ ciency: A shift of task towards the EU layer is 
efﬁ ciency enhancing if it either allows the same level of public service using less resources; or 
if higher levels of public goods and services can be supplied at the same costs as under national 
provision. Both cost savings and efﬁ ciency gains are crucial in the context of the European debt 
crisis and the prospect of low growth in the coming years. From a political point of view, this 
is important because this potentially helps solve conﬂ icts between net contributing countries 
and net recipient countries, or among net contributors. From a legal point of view, the concept 
of added value is of particular importance where the EU and the national level have competing 
competencies (Schreyer 2011). 
Conceptual framework
Definitions of net benefits and European added value
From an economic point of view, public spending at the European level ideally fulﬁ ls two types 
of criteria: It should entail both positive net beneﬁ ts and European added value of public spend-
ing. It is important to take into account that both criteria are distinct.
3  As Zuleeg (2011) points out, added value in European policy debates fundamentally differs from economic value added in the production process. 
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Net beneﬁ ts are the difference between the sum of direct and indirect beneﬁ ts, on the one hand, 
and direct and indirect costs, on the other. The direct costs and beneﬁ ts of any public project are 
usually easy to identify and typically beneﬁ cial, for instance in terms of employment generated 
or private investment triggered. The indirect effects are much harder to identify and quantify. 
Moreover, they usually relate to either opportunity costs (i.e. foregone beneﬁ ts of other projects 
that were not ﬁ nanced) or ﬁ nancing costs (i.e. the distortionary effects of taxation that would 
otherwise not be necessary). Positive net beneﬁ ts can usually be expected when critical public 
goods, which private markets would typically not supply, are provided by the government, and 
when these public goods provide services that enhance private-sector productivity. 
European added value essentially compares the net beneﬁ ts of spending by national governments 
with those that arise from spending in the same category at the European level. In this sense, 
added value is technically the difference between the net beneﬁ ts of spending at the EU level 
and the net beneﬁ ts at the national level. This is in line with the deﬁ nition of the EU Commission 
European 
Added Value
Net 
benefi ts
Net 
benefi ts
EU National
Entity
Net 
return
Figure 1: European added value vs. positive net benefi ts of EU spending
Source: Own illustration
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(2011:1): “the value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would 
have been otherwise created by member state action alone”. Figure 1 illustrates the concepts of 
net beneﬁ ts and added value.
Potential causes of added value
Clarifying the conceptual underpinnings of added value requires understanding its potential 
underlying causes, i.e. the reasons why spending at the EU level may involve added value. 
Broadly speaking, there are three broader potential causes of ‘added value’ of public spending at 
the European level vis-à-vis the national level: 
 (1) economic causes that relate to traditional arguments; 
 (2) economic causes that relate to more modern arguments; and 
 (3) causes based on political economy and governance-related arguments. 
Figure 2: Potential causes of European added value
Source: Own illustration
European 
Added Value
Economic Sources: 
Modern View
· Quality from greater Choices
· Threshold Effects
Economic Sources: 
Traditional View
· Benefi t Spillovers
· Production Effi ciency
Political Economy 
and Governance
· Limitation of Wasteful Competition
· Government Failures
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The traditional arguments are rooted in ﬁ scal federalism literature (see for instance Oates 1972, 
2005) whereas the modern arguments have mostly been used just recently and in the context 
of public spending at the European level. These sources of added value cause the differences 
between the net beneﬁ ts of national public spending and those of EU spending (see Figure 2).
Economic causes of EU added value – traditional arguments
· Many public services entail signiﬁ cant crossborder beneﬁ t spillovers that cannot be internal-
ized by national governments. This implies that they may not be supplied at sufﬁ cient levels. 
One of the most important policy ﬁ elds to which this argument applies is the support of trans-
European transport networks. Consequently, these types of public services are generally 
underprovided in the absence of international cooperation or supranational provision. It is the 
internalization of crossborder effects that creates European added value. The reason here is 
that the net beneﬁ ts of public spending at the national level are lower simply because the 
quantities of the public services provided by national governments are lower. 
· With public services being non-rival in consumption to some extent – economies of scale arise if 
the per capita cost of providing a public good decreases (see Schwager in this volume). In turn, 
given that the EU provides public services to a larger number of beneﬁ ciaries than national 
governments, the per capita costs of provision decline. Economies of scale may arise in various 
areas of public spending. Christoffersen (2011) suggests that under certain conditions there 
may be economies of scale in ﬁ nancial support to third countries that are operated through 
ﬁ nancial instruments at the EU level. Defence provides non-rival beneﬁ ts as well; in this sense 
providing defence at the EU level has clearly a potential for added value. A similar expectation 
is warranted with respect to common consular services for EU countries, although the absolute 
magnitude of potential added value is smaller compared to defence spending due to the much 
smaller absolute size of spending. 
· Every public service provided by governments or the EU needs to be produced using human, 
ﬁ nancial, and other resources. In turn, the production efﬁ ciency in the sense of lower costs per 
unit may be higher at the EU level for several reasons. First, the production may be subject 
to economies that result in unit costs declining with the amount produced. These types of 
economies of scale are different than ones that arise because of the non-rivalry of the beneﬁ ts 
and mainly relate to ﬁ xed costs that are independent from the ﬁ nal amount of output. In this 
scenario, they simply arise if the provision for several countries is ‘bundled’ at the European 
level so that the quantities produced at the EU level exceed those produced at the national level. 
Here defence may be an important example as well.
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 Second, economies of scope may also contribute to higher efﬁ ciency at the EU level. Economies 
of scope, by contrast, refer to synergy effects that arise at the EU level but not at the national 
level. Reasons may include better communication with respect to problems and solutions for 
particular projects or common project management at the EU level (Begg et al. 1993). Finally, it 
is also conceivable that the EU has access to a more efﬁ cient production technology. At the EU 
level, it may be easier to beneﬁ t from knowledge transfers of best practices, or leakage of funds 
may simply be lower due to better management practices. The European Institute of Technol-
ogy, for instance, ensures the dissemination of best knowledge practices within Europe and 
promotes partnerships of research, higher education, and innovative entrepreneurs or sectors 
(European Commission 2007). 
Economic sources of EU added value – Modern arguments
· Public services provided at the European level may be of higher quality, which is related to 
the argument of production efﬁ ciency. The idea of this modern view is that certain public 
services and interventions carried out at the European level beneﬁ t from a much larger pool of 
potential suppliers. As a result, the best applicants for a project can be selected from a larger 
pool thereby increasing the overall quality. For instance, European-funded research programs 
can possibly add value as compared to national research programs because of the larger pool 
of resources, both ﬁ nancial and human.
· Large-scale public projects with high ﬁ xed costs involve funding requirements that exceed 
the ﬁ nancial capacity of individual member states. In other words, various public services are 
subject to threshold effects implying that only jurisdictions that exceed a certain size are able to 
provide them. In such a case, the EU (or some other form of international organization or coop-
eration) would be better suited than national jurisdictions to provide them. These threshold 
effects are essentially an extreme type of economies of scale. A potential example of a public 
good that might be subject to such threshold effects is GALILEO, although the net beneﬁ ts of 
this project are contested. 
· On a related note, Oates (1988) emphasizes the variety of public goods and services. Since there are 
high ﬁ xed costs for the provision of particular public goods, “it does not become desirable to provide 
the good until population reaches a certain critical size” (Oates 1988: 88). That is the size for which 
people’s willingness to pay equals (or exceeds) the unit costs. This is called the ‘zoo effect’ of 
public good provision, which was recently investigated empirically by Frère et al. (2011) for French 
local governments. The authors ﬁ nd evidence “that the variety of services provided in large inter-
municipalities exceed those in smaller communities” (Frère et al. 2011: 20). As a result, the added 
value of EU interventions might also be created because of a larger variety of provided goods and 
services as compared to the national level – even if per capita costs remain nearly unchanged.
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Political economy and governance-related sources of added value
· Public spending at the European level potentially adds value by limiting wasteful competition 
among national governments. For instance, subsidies paid by national governments to particu-
lar industries or sectors may result in a “subsidy race to the top”. In this case, governments try 
to pay more than their peers in order to attract foreign ﬁ rms (Janeba 1998). Paying subsidies 
at the European level thereby can add value because this type of wasteful competition and the 
level of subsidies paid are likely to be contained. This type of argument may in principle apply 
to agricultural policy. Whether this is really the case, however, must be investigated in detail. 
· Whereas national governments tend to be short-sighted because of relatively short electoral 
cycles, policymaking and hence public-spending decisions at the European level are partially 
decoupled from national electoral cycles and may therefore focus to a greater extent on the 
medium to long run. This implies that there is the possibility that at the European level govern-
ment failures are less severe: public spending allocation and composition within certain sec-
tors could be potentially more focused on long-run objectives such as economic growth, which 
thereby provides added value vis-à-vis the national level. 
· A shift of public spending to the supra-national level in line with a limitation of lobbying and 
corruption are further potential sources of added value. However, the effects of lobbying and 
its impact on decision-making distortions between the different layers of governments are 
not that clear. Some studies state that the power of interest groups is better contained with 
decentralized politics (see e.g. Vaubel 1999). Others (Tabellini and Wyplosz 2004) argue that 
the power of lobbying under centralisation depends on the homogeneity of national interest 
groups. If national interest groups across Europe have identical objectives they will be able 
to speak with one voice and defend their interests at the European level effectively. In this 
case, centralized policy making will be particularly vulnerable to interest group distortions. 
If, on the contrary, the interests of national lobbies are heterogeneous across Europe, this will 
weaken their EU impact so that European centralisation has the beneﬁ cial side-effect of con-
taining lobby power.
Positive net benefits and added value compared
Both concepts, that of positive net beneﬁ ts and that of added value, are only indirectly related 
to each other. Confusion of the concepts is one frequent shortcoming of current European added 
value applications. Evidence of positive net beneﬁ ts of EU spending is neither a necessary nor 
a sufﬁ cient condition for the existence of European added value. Indeed, a key dimension of 
European added value is that the net beneﬁ ts of EU spending exceed those of a national reference 
case irrespective of whether the net beneﬁ ts are positive or not. The key insight is therefore that 
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European added value is a relative concept 
(which has also been emphasized by others, 
e.g. Zuleeg 2011).
Spending at the European level may entail 
added value. Take, for example, if the ben-
eﬁ ts exceed those that would arise if the same 
spending were undertaken by national govern-
ments. There would be added value even if the 
net beneﬁ ts of this type of spending are nega-
tive (e.g. a harmful subsidy) as demonstrated 
in Figure 3. The ﬁ rst-best solution would be 
that no government entity ﬁ nances this par-
ticular policy. If this is not feasible, due to 
political constraints, an EU involvement may 
still create added value if it limits the losses 
of this public spending type and furnishes a 
less distorting type of subsidy. In other words, 
spending at the European level may still be 
justiﬁ ed as a second-best approach when the 
ﬁ rst-best approach is unavailable. 
Furthermore, positive net beneﬁ ts of EU spending on their own are not sufﬁ cient for added value. 
With positive net beneﬁ ts a meaningful added value test would have to demonstrate that the net 
beneﬁ ts of EU spending exceed those of spending at the national level (Figure 1).
Given that the distinction between positive net beneﬁ ts and European added value may seem 
subtle, it is not surprising that in practice, for simplicity, the concept of positive net beneﬁ ts and 
added value are frequently conﬂ ated. For instance, the European Commission (2011:25) claims 
that “the CAP provides European added value by supplying European citizens with safe and high 
quality food in a competitive market”. This contrasts with the deﬁ nition by the European Com-
mission (European Commission, 2011: 1) (“the value resulting from an EU intervention which is 
additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by member state action alone”) 
which is the one we use.4 High quality and safe food are certainly beneﬁ ts. But the costs to 
achieve this objective must also be considered. They are not related to added value and thereby 
do not justify any action by the EU. This underlines the need for a concise and transparent frame-
work which speciﬁ es various causes of why added value arises. 
4  The European Commission released a working paper accompanying its proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, A Budget for Europe 2020.
Figure 3: European added value vs. 
negative net benefi ts of EU spending
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Source: Own illustration
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Existing methodologies and evidence
Conceptually, it is fairly straight forward to develop the framework of added value. On the 
contrary, testing and evaluating in practice whether speciﬁ c public spending categories entail 
added value is much more difﬁ cult. If it had been done at all, it was seldom based on rigorous 
methods.5 There is a range of studies that evaluate whether the EU or national governments 
should undertake public spending in particular categories. Broadly speaking, these studies apply 
mostly qualitative criteria or use various different indicators that are thought to represent value 
added. Consequently, existing studies give rather a crude assessment of potential beneﬁ ts based 
on simple reasoning or anecdotal evidence. They do not provide robust quantitative evidence of 
the magnitude of added value.
Most qualitative assessments of added value are typically based on arguments from theories of 
ﬁ scal federalism. They analyse the trade-off between the beneﬁ ts and costs of centralisation. 
Beneﬁ ts of centralisation may arise from economies of scale or beneﬁ t spillovers and costs can 
emerge due to preference heterogeneity across sub-central jurisdictions (see Alesina and Waczi-
arg 1999, for a theoretical model on the optimal allocation of prerogatives in the EU). Ederveen 
et al. (2008) develop a ‘subsidiarity test’ based on these arguments that require answers to the 
three following questions:
· Do crossborder externalities or economies of scale justify centralisation?
· Is credible voluntary cooperation possible?
· At which level can policies be designed and implemented in a cost-minimizing manner?
The most comprehensive analysis of EU spending is a study by several economic research insti-
tutes (ECORYS et al. 2008).6 This research uses the subsidiarity test developed by Ederveen et al. 
(2008) as well as political economic criteria to assess the assignment of competences between the 
EU level and the member states. ECORYS et al. (2008). Interestingly, the evaluations of speciﬁ c 
spending items vary strongly within the broad expenditure category. Concerning EU cohesion 
policy, the evaluation of the territorial cooperation dimension (mostly trans-European networks) 
is entirely positive. Whereas the added value of the ‘competitiveness and employment’ objective, 
which mainly beneﬁ ts the richer regions of the Union, is rather negative.7 In particular, the report 
highlights three broad policy areas in which an expansion of the EU expenditures could lead to 
5  There is a related literature that compares the efficiency in public good provision for territorial units which differ in their degree of centralisation. Barankay 
and Lockwood (2007) show that more decentralized Swiss cantons are associated with higher educational attainment. Using a panel of OECD countries 
Adam et al. (2008) show that the overall public sector efficiency is increasing with fiscal decentralisation. However, this paper does not differentiate 
between different policy areas. Their findings thus are of limited use for our purpose.
6  The study was commissioned by the European Commission as part of the mid-term review 2008/2009.
7  The study identifies the following potential sources of European added value: economies of scale, externalities, limits to system competition (e.g. subsidy 
races), second-best arguments (e.g. due to lack of foresight in policymaking at the national level), complementarity between policies (i.e. positive effects 
for other EU policies) and lobbying (since lower level governments are more susceptible to the influences of lobby groups).
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an increased added value for the citizens: climate change and energy resources, knowledge and 
innovation, and common security and foreign affairs. 
Alesina et al. (2005) include a similar assessment of EU spending that is based on criteria from 
ﬁ scal federalism theory. In particular, they focus on the trade-off between the beneﬁ ts of cen-
tralisation (which arise from economies of scale or externalities) and the costs of harmonizing 
policies in view of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in a larger union. In 
contrast to the ECORYS study, Alesina et al. (2005) also quantify the costs of centralisation due to 
preference heterogeneity based on opinion survey data. Given that they only perform an ad-hoc 
assessment of the magnitude of the beneﬁ ts relative to other public spending categories, this 
type of one-sided quantiﬁ cation seems problematic. 
More recent academic contributions to the general review of the EU budget continue to criticize 
the EU expenditure structure as being unsuitable from an economic perspective. For instance, 
Gros (2008: 15) criticises that “(v)ery little is spent in areas where one would expect real ‘value 
added’ from Union level spending”, whereas “expenditure on agriculture, a declining industry, 
absorbs an inordinate budget share and re-distribution dominates the rest”. Similarly, Begg 
(2009: 31) argues that “most of today’s EU budget is distributive (namely the common agricul-
tural policy and cohesion) and that true European public goods are a minor share”. Gros suggests 
that the provision of European public goods should be the guiding principle for the EU budget, 
and identiﬁ es two areas with a high potential of EU funding: R&D as well as internal and external 
security. This argumentation is obviously inspired by ﬁ scal federalism theory, but does not make 
any reference to quantitative ﬁ ndings. Instead, only hints are given that “one ﬁ eld that typically 
serves the public good and whose beneﬁ ts extend far beyond national boundaries is research 
and development (R&D)” (Gros, 2008: 5), and that “the economies of scale in the ﬁ eld of external 
security have been vividly illustrated in recent conﬂ icts, from Kosovo to Iraq” (Gros 2008: 6). 
Begg (2009), in turn, agrees that many new spending priorities of the EU are easily imaginable, 
but he is rather critical to the political feasibility of changes based on simple economic reason-
ing. He claims that “concepts such as subsidiarity and proportionality, or the assertion that EU 
spending must be conﬁ ned to policies for which there is a demonstrable added value, can sound 
too abstract to be operational”. 
The European Commission (2011) also evaluates added value based on a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Generally speaking, impact indicators are presented based on the false 
assumption that they reﬂ ect added value. Again, the qualitative assessment is based on ﬁ scal 
federalism arguments. For instance, the European Commission (2011) implicitly stipulates that 
the number of jobs created and the number of ﬁ rms that received various types of support are 
part of the evidence that cohesion policy entails value added. 
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With respect to other public spending categories, the reasoning of the European Commission 
seems more convincing but is mostly of qualitative nature. For instance, the European Com-
mission (2011) contends that EU-funded research adds high value by facilitating researchers to 
engage in large scale projects that are more complex and competitive than national programs. 
Similarly, the European Commission (2011) suggests that EU health spending may entail added 
value. For example, the EU cooperation initiative on crossborder diseases that involves the joint 
procurement of pandemic vaccines may possibly result in lower unit costs and thereby in efﬁ -
ciency gains. However, given the mix of approaches and types of arguments used for various 
public spending categories, the European Commission (2011) provides hardly any systematic 
guidance about which public spending categories involve value-added and which do not.
Quantifying European added value
In order to rigorously quantify European added value, one has to proceed in two steps. The ﬁ rst 
step is to establish a counterfactual, namely to ask what is compared. The second step consists 
of choosing a suitable empirical methodology, namely to decide how net beneﬁ ts are measured. 
Before
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Non-
Member 
State
National
Spending
Large
After
Accession
Member 
State
Small
EU
Figure 4: Possible comparisons to estimate European value added
Source: Own illustration
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Identifying suitable comparisons
For any quantiﬁ cation approach the distinction between both dimensions – net beneﬁ ts and 
added value – is fundamental. This distinction underlines that European added value is an inher-
ently relative concept. Thus, any empirical approach must to some extent include a comparison 
between the beneﬁ ts of spending by different levels of government. There is an empirical coun-
terpart to this which is essentially the identiﬁ cation of a counterfactual. In principle, there may 
be four types of counterfactuals and comparisons that are to be chosen depending on the public 
spending category in question. These are illustrated in Figure 4.
 
1) The net beneﬁ ts of public spending in a particular category in EU member states can be 
compared to European countries that are not EU members. This includes Norway and Swit-
zerland in Western Europe but also various countries in Eastern Europe and South Eastern 
Europe, which are fairly similar in terms of the level of development and various structural 
features. Alternatively, Cramon-Taubadel (2011) proposes a more sophisticated approach to 
predict the public spending level in agriculture in EU member countries that would prevail 
in the absence of EU spending, based on a function of various country-speciﬁ c features and 
political economy-related factors. This type of function would be derived using regression-
based techniques and data from non-EU members. Under this approach, a lower level of 
public spending in agriculture at the EU level would imply that there is European added 
value based on the assumption that agricultural spending is harmful or is at least less ben-
eﬁ cial than other types of public expenditure. Where countries joined the European Union 
in the recent past, a before-after comparison of the net beneﬁ ts is possible in the sense 
that net beneﬁ ts of EU spending in this type of country are compared to the net beneﬁ ts 
of national public spending of the same country before accession. Suitable countries may 
be those western European countries that joined most recently including Austria, Sweden, 
and Finland, which have not been undergoing major structural changes since their acces-
sion to the EU.
2) In principle it is conceivable that some types of public spending are undertaken both by 
the EU and by individual member states. This implies that in these cases, a comparison 
of the net beneﬁ ts within the same country and year is possible as long as the effects of 
public spending by different layers of government can be disentangled. Related to this, 
some areas of EU spending have only been recently established. In this case, a before-
after-comparison is possible (i.e. to compare the net beneﬁ ts of these public spending 
types when they were only in the national domain with the net beneﬁ ts of spending at the 
EU level after the policy change). 
3) For those areas of public spending that are currently not part of EU expenditure policy, it 
would be possible to ‘simulate’ the effects of size by comparing large to small countries 
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that are either members or not members. While this type of comparison is certainly imper-
fect in many cases and cannot be used to quantify the effects of differences of governance 
or political economy on added value, it is certainly suitable to uncover economies of scale, 
for example. 
4) The CAP may serve as an example to illustrate the empirical procedure given that there 
is limited agricultural spending at the level of the EU member states and that European 
law limits national spending autonomy. In order to assess the potential added value of the 
CAP, it is necessary to compare the effectiveness or simply the level of the CAP with agri-
cultural spending in OECD countries that share similar features with EU member states. 
Alternatively, a ‘before-after’ comparison could be applied by analyzing the impact of EU 
membership on agricultural subsidies and protection in new member countries. This type of 
empirical comparison must be at the centre of any serious attempts to quantify added value.
The choice and feasibility of the comparison type chosen determine the type of policy recom-
mendations that could be drawn. The policy recommendations emerging from (4) are strongest 
in the sense that they suggest efﬁ ciency gains if those areas of public spending with added value 
are transferred to the EU level. The same applies to (3) when public spending responsibilities are 
shared, although to a lesser extent.
However, there are several potential caveats. First, when comparing the net beneﬁ ts of public 
spending between small and large countries (comparison 3), it is questionable whether and 
under what circumstances the results can be extrapolated to the EU level as even large countries 
may seem small relative to the European Union as a whole. Second, when comparing the net 
beneﬁ ts of EU spending to the net beneﬁ ts of spending in countries outside the European Union, 
the choice of countries might heavily affect the results and the policy recommendations that 
emerge. For instance, in the context of agricultural policy, subsidies are low in Australia and 
New Zealand but much higher in Switzerland. Third, as Zuleeg (2011) points out, the objectives of 
and the preferences with respect to public spending or its underlying rationale may differ across 
jurisdictions. When making comparisons across different countries, these differences need to be 
taken into account because otherwise the comparison may be misleading. 
Identifying suitable empirical methodologies
Challenges: Having identiﬁ ed the comparative benchmark, the next step is to compare the net 
beneﬁ ts of public spending in a particular category at the European level with those that arise 
when the same type of public spending is undertaken at the national level. Quantifying the net 
beneﬁ ts of any narrowly deﬁ ned public spending category even in a national context is however 
demanding for three reasons. 
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First, measuring the beneﬁ ts, notably the indirect ones, may not be feasible. One problem that 
arises in this context is that observable economic and social outcomes, such as growth or unem-
ployment rates, cannot be attributed to a particular public spending category because it is either 
difﬁ cult to establish causality or to isolate the effects of particular public spending categories 
from other factors that impact on these outcomes. 
Second, evaluating outcomes is also difﬁ cult in another sense as this requires a judgment about 
whether these outcomes are desirable. While growth promotion and unemployment reduction 
are universally seen as beneﬁ cial, the outcomes of defence spending are not. 
Third, certain taxes not only impose a direct ﬁ nancial burden but also cause distortions that 
result in additional costs. Thus, considering the full ﬁ nancing costs when measuring the net 
beneﬁ ts is tricky and may not be feasible in all cases. 
Overall approach: In order to address these difﬁ culties, it is important to clearly distinguish 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes of public spending. In this context, the outputs are simply the 
goods and services that the government provides, whereas the inputs are the ﬁ nancial resources 
used by the government to produce the output and only reﬂ ect the direct costs. By contrast, the 
outcomes are the effects of social objectives like employment and growth that the outputs as well 
as the inputs together with the indirect costs presumably impact on.8
Given the difﬁ culties associated with quantifying outcomes, one sensible approach rests on focus-
ing on the evaluation of inputs, outputs, or a combination of both in order to obtain a measure of 
net beneﬁ ts. This measure can in turn be compared across jurisdictions to obtain a measure of 
added value. The advantage is that this approach avoids quantifying the outcomes. Any input and 
output based evaluation of added value remains silent of the desirability of any speciﬁ c public 
spending category. This is acceptable in this context as the objective of quantifying added value 
is not to judge whether speciﬁ c goods and services should be publicly provided or not. Instead, the 
objective is to evaluate at what level public goods and services should be provided. An approach 
focusing on inputs and outputs serves this purpose. In principle, there are three types of speciﬁ c 
evaluations:
1)  The ﬁ rst comparison is simply to compare inputs, namely expenditure per capita within a 
narrowly deﬁ ned spending category in small and large jurisdictions if public spending out-
puts are approximately identical. If expenditure per capita is lower in the large jurisdiction, 
the beneﬁ ts of the public service may be non-rival which in turn results in economies of 
scale. However, expenditures per capita as an indicator are not useful to consider if the level 
of outputs differs. For instance, per capita spending increasing with size may simply reﬂ ect 
8  These definitions are similar to those used by the OECD (2002).
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differences in the level of output between the large jurisdiction and the small one. In cases 
where expenditure data is not available, a ‘bottom-up’ approach could instead be chosen 
where various public services are costed multiplying the unit costs of various items and the 
quantities required. 
2)  As an alternative, expenditure per output units (i.e. the ratio of inputs to outputs) may be 
compared. This type of indicator adjusts for differences in the level of outputs, but it ignores 
economies of scale that are the result of non-rival beneﬁ ts. Another more sophisticated 
approach, which also combines input and output measures, relies on the derivation of public 
spending efﬁ ciency indicators.9 Speciﬁ c actions are efﬁ cient if either the inputs to reach a 
given amount of outputs are minimised (input-oriented measure) or – given a certain amount 
of inputs – the quantity of output is maximised (output-oriented measure). To compare these 
efﬁ ciency indicators, the best-practice case must be identiﬁ ed through employing math-
ematical or econometric methods.10 This best-practice case shows the optimal ratio of inputs 
and outputs compared to the remaining jurisdictions. Subsequently, the efﬁ ciency distance 
between each jurisdiction and the best-practice unit can be derived. This distance yields 
efﬁ ciency-indicators that are comparable across the different jurisdictions: the greater the 
distance is, the lower is the unit’s efﬁ ciency. 
3) The strengths of both indicators may be combined by comparing unit expenditure per capita 
(i.e. the ratio of inputs to outputs divided by the size of the population) which may take into 
account differences in output levels produced and economies of scale due to non-rival beneﬁ ts.
Caveats and potential other methods: Nevertheless, there are a number of important caveats in the 
use of all of these indicators so that they may only be carefully used. First, the conclusions that 
emerge from these types of comparisons are misleading if the outputs are of different quality, and 
it is very difﬁ cult to account for differences in quality when solely focusing on inputs. If quality 
indeed differs, low spending in large jurisdictions may simply reﬂ ect poor quality rather than 
economies of scale.
Second, as Schwager as well as Büttner and Holm-Hadulla (2008) claim, there is a strong theoreti-
cal reason why economies of scale may actually induce per capita spending of a particular public 
service to be higher in large jurisdictions. The reason is that low costs induce larger jurisdictions 
to provide a higher level of public services, and, if demand for this public service is sufﬁ ciently 
price-elastic, they will incur higher overall level of spending. If this effect is indeed present, the 
use and comparison of input indicators may lead to false conclusions with respect to potential 
European added value. 
9  For instance, von Cramon-Taubadel (2011) suggests the derivation of these efficiency indicators as one possible research strategy in the field of the CAP.
10  Methods to derive these efficiency scores are, e.g., a data envelopment analysis (DEA) or a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
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Third, the magnitude of the net beneﬁ ts depends on the perspective taken. For instance, the net 
beneﬁ ts of transferring a speciﬁ c public spending category to the EU level may be negative from 
the perspective of some member countries. In other words, even when there is aggregate added 
value of various public spending categories, it may not be evenly distributed among all member 
countries. We recognize this point, although we believe that economically, aggregate value added 
is sufﬁ cient to justify spending at the EU level. 
With respect to other possible methods, meta-analyses might be applied. They provide an alterna-
tive to the direct empirical scrutiny of policy ﬁ elds as they exploit the existing literature. A meta-
analysis condenses a variety of empirical studies devoted to one common research question into 
quantitative information (Stanley 1989). In principle, such an approach could be used to compare 
the net beneﬁ t of national programs – as it has been detected in the literature – with that of similar 
EU programs. 
One existing attempt to apply meta-analytical techniques to the impact analysis for the EU budget 
(Euréval and Rambøll Management 2008) indicates that meta-approaches for such a broad and 
diverse issue necessarily end up in highly qualitative insights and can miss the objective of quan-
tiﬁ cation. Therefore, we are cautious about whether meta-analyses can be made operational in the 
context of European value added analyses. 
Outlook
European added value is a potentially powerful concept to evaluate and justify public spending 
at the EU level which is of both economic and political signiﬁ cance. This chapter has developed a 
conceptual framework that contextualizes the notion of added value and explains the underlying 
causes of why it arises. It can be used as guidance for empirical exercises quantifying the added 
value of particular public spending categories. However, given that European added value is inher-
ently a ‘relative’ concept and based on the comparison between the net beneﬁ ts of public spend-
ing by different levels of government, the identiﬁ cation of counterfactuals is the main empirical 
challenge. It needs to be addressed by further research that attempts to quantify European added 
value of public spending. Overall, such quantiﬁ cation seems possible, at least for selected policy 
ﬁ elds. Particularly promising for such empirical, evidence-based research are the following poli-
cies that served as case studies in the framework of this project (see subsequent chapters):
Common agricultural policies are an application for a ﬁ eld where a European added value could 
perhaps result from a limitation of waste and inefﬁ ciencies associated with national protection 
regimes. Even if the net beneﬁ t of the EU CAP were negative (due to distortions and hampering 
of structural change) it could nevertheless still be associated with a European added value if the 
(ﬁ ctitious) national regime were even more detrimental. 
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Embassies and consular services are a much smaller policy ﬁ eld in terms of budget. But these 
types of services offer another ﬁ eld with an obvious potential for saving national money through 
reaping European economies of scale. Quantiﬁ cations are, however, confronted with the prob-
lem that these services only partially are characterized by non-rivalry. Nevertheless, given the 
recent European dynamism on that ﬁ eld (European External Action Service) it is worthwhile to 
check the qualitative argument of potential savings through rigorous quantiﬁ cations.
Defence is a policy ﬁ eld where the potential for economies of scale appears substantial and where 
a sufﬁ cient data base exists for exploring possible cost savings through meaningful quantiﬁ ca-
tions. Of course, any step towards a truly European defence policy is confronted with political 
restrictions and national resistance to a loss of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate under-
taking to calculate through appropriate quantiﬁ cations the price tag that is associated with the 
political preference for defence autonomy.
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Case Study 1: CAP
Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Friedrich Heinemann, Florian Misch, Stefani Weiss
The EU spends over Euro 50 billion each year on its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Figure 1). 
Although the CAP’s share of overall EU expenditure has fallen from over 70 percent in the early 
1980s to roughly 45 percent today, it remains the largest item in the EU budget. 
Critics argue that expenditure on the CAP is misspent because the same money could generate 
much more European added value (EAV) if it were spent in other areas such as research and infra-
structure development. While this argument sounds plausible, the EAV of expenditure on the CAP 
(or any other type of EU expenditure) is difﬁ cult to measure.1 The CAP generates a wide variety 
of costs and beneﬁ ts. Some of these costs and beneﬁ ts (e.g. budget expenditure, increased farm 
incomes) can be measured with relative ease. But others, such as groundwater pollution or the 
maintenance of open landscapes, are non-monetary and difﬁ cult to quantify. 
Furthermore, whether CAP expenditure generates EAV is not just a question of whether its beneﬁ ts 
exceed its costs, even if these could be quantiﬁ ed. In the absence of a CAP, the member states would 
implement national agricultural policies (NAPs) instead. These NAPs would also generate costs and 
beneﬁ ts. The CAP generates EAV only if it generates net beneﬁ ts in excess of those that would result 
from the implementation of NAPs in the individual member states. Hence, in order to determine 
whether the CAP generates EAV one must not only measure all of its costs and beneﬁ ts (Task 1); 
one must also predict what NAPs the member states would implement in the absence of the CAP, 
and estimate their costs and beneﬁ ts (Task 2). The second task of generating a national agricultural 
policy counterfactual for each of the member states is even more daunting than the ﬁ rst.
 
This study attempts to reduce these tasks to a manageable size in order to generate some limited 
but nonetheless pertinent insights into the EAV of the CAP. To this end this study does not consider 
Does the CAP Cap 
Agricultural Spending 
in the EU?
1  For a detailed discussion of the definition and measurement of European added value see introductory chapter and the contributions of H. Pitlik and R. Schwager 
in this volume. 
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the full range of costs and beneﬁ ts of the CAP. Instead, we focus on a key component of these costs 
and beneﬁ ts – public expenditure. Speciﬁ cally, we attempt to answer the question whether public 
expenditure on the CAP is lower or higher than the sum of the public expenditures on the NAPs 
that would be implemented in its absence. 
To focus exclusively on public expenditure is to take a very partial view of the full range of CAP 
costs and beneﬁ ts. Policies that require little public expenditure are not necessarily less costly 
from a comprehensive economic perspective than policies that require more. For example, pro-
tective import tariffs lead to misallocation of resources and can thus impose signiﬁ cant costs on 
an economy, even though they generate public revenues (i.e. negative expenditure) in the form of 
import duties. 
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Figure 1: CAP Expenditure and its share of total EU expenditure (in current prices)
Source: EU Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf
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Nevertheless, whether the CAP triggers more or less public expenditure than the NAPs that would 
replace it is an important question. Defenders of the CAP sometimes argue that agricultural policy 
coordination at the EU level keeps public expenditure in check because it limits the inﬂ uence of 
local lobbies and reduces the impact of short national electoral cycles on agricultural policy making. 
According to this reasoning, the result is a more rational policy that is less prone to subsidy races 
and beggar-thy-neighbour protection than NAPs would be. If this is true, then the CAP – whether 
or not it generates net EAV – at least saves the member states (in aggregate) money. 
Critics of the CAP argue that the opposite is true. Since the CAP is ﬁ nanced out of the EU budget, each 
member state has an incentive to push for measures that increase CAP outlays for its own farmers. 
This is because each member state only has to foot a portion of the bill for these measures in accor-
dance with its share in ﬁ nancing the overall EU budget.2 According to this reasoning, agricultural 
policy coordination at the EU level will lead to more and not less public expenditure than NAPs would.
This study attempts to determine which of these arguments is correct: Is the CAP more or less 
expensive than the NAPs that would be implemented in its stead? To answer this question, we 
must carry out reduced versions of the two tasks outlined above. First, we must determine the 
current level of CAP expenditure. This is, thanks to the OECD data on the agricultural policies of 
its members, a straightforward task. Second, we must generate a counterfactual: What levels of 
public expenditure would prevail in the individual member states if there were no CAP and each 
implemented its own NAP instead? This is a much more difﬁ cult and inherently speculative task 
because we cannot know for sure what type of national agricultural policy member states such as 
Germany, France, and Poland would choose if there were no CAP.
However, this task is not as hopeless as it might appear at ﬁ rst glance. Past research has demon-
strated that the type of agricultural policy that a country chooses is systematically inﬂ uenced by 
its economic and political-economic characteristics – for example, its comparative advantage in 
agriculture, the size of any income disparity between its farm and non-farm populations, and the 
size of its farm population. 
Drawing on this research this study proceeds as follows: First we estimate the relationship 
between key economic and political-economic characteristics and public expenditure on NAPs in 
set of non-EU OECD countries such as Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S. We next use this estimated 
relationship to predict the levels of public expenditure on national agricultural policy that each EU 
member state would choose if there were no CAP. Finally, we compare these simulated national 
expenditures with the actual level of CAP expenditure to determine whether the CAP increases or 
reduces public expenditure. We ﬁ nd that simulated expenditure on NAPs and actual expenditure 
2  This so-called ‘common pool’ problem is sometimes explained using the analogy of a group of size ‘n’ that dines together in a restaurant. If the members 
of the group agree in advance that they will split the bill, each has an incentive to order an expensive dish, because he/she will only have to pay one-nth 
of the additional cost of that dish.
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on the CAP have not differed greatly, but that there is some indication that the CAP has capped 
expenditure on agricultural policy in recent years. 
Using the results of these calculations we also compare simulated levels of national public expendi-
ture on agricultural policy with the net ﬁ nancial in- and outﬂ ows that the individual member states 
currently realise as a result of the CAP. As illustrated in Figure 2, the ﬁ scal costs and beneﬁ ts of the 
CAP are distributed unevenly across the individual members states, with some (most prominently 
Germany, Italy, and the UK) making substantial net contributions, and others (such as Greece, 
Spain, and Poland) beneﬁ ting from substantial net receipts. Even if expenditure on the CAP were 
exactly as high as expenditure on the NAPs that would be implemented in its stead, we demon-
strate that the distribution of this expenditure across member states would differ considerably from 
the distributions depicted in Figure 2. Hence, the renationalisation of agricultural policy would 
lead to a signiﬁ cant realignment of the current net contributor / net recipient balance in the EU. 
For example, Germany, Italy and the UK would spend similar amounts on NAPs as they currently 
contribute to the CAP budget. However, while large portions of their current contributions are net 
contributions that beneﬁ t other member states, expenditure on NAPs would beneﬁ t their domestic 
farmers. Hence, these countries would see their net contributions reduced. Other member states, 
such as Ireland, Greece and Spain, receive net payments from the CAP that would be no longer ﬂ ow 
in the absence of the CAP.
Explaining public expenditure on agricultural policy 
A framework for explaining agricultural policies
To simulate public expenditures on the NAPs that would be implemented in the absence of the 
CAP we draw on extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of agricul-
tural policies. A point of departure for much of this literature is an apparent paradox that was 
documented in a seminal comparative study of agricultural protection by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdez (1988), namely the fact that developing countries tend to tax their agricultural sectors 
while industrialised countries tend to subsidise them.3 This may seem paradoxical because the 
relative size and importance of agriculture generally declines in the course of economic develop-
ment, both economically and in terms of population. Hence, one might expect that as the size of 
the sector declines, so would its political weight, and with it the support that it is able to ‘extract’ 
from the rest of the economy.
Mancur Olson made an important contribution to solving this paradox with his 1965 book Logic of 
Collective Action. Olson pointed out that collective action such as lobbying is subject to freeriding 
3  A study coordinated by Anderson (2009) reveals that the taxation of agriculture in many developing countries has been reduced since Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdez published their findings. Nevertheless, as a stylised fact there continues to be a positive relationship between economic development and the 
level of agricultural support.
40
Case Study 1: CAP
by its potential beneﬁ ciaries. For example, since all farmers beneﬁ t from agricultural support 
measures once they are implemented, it makes sense for the individual farmer to abstain from 
lobbying for these measures. Instead, the rational farmer will let other farmers lobby, and then 
enjoy the resulting beneﬁ ts. Of course, if all farmers reason this way, none will invest resources 
in lobbying, and support measures will not be implemented. This freeriding problem can be over-
come if the costs of organising farmers and monitoring them to ensure that they all contribute 
to the lobbying effort are sufﬁ ciently small. These organisation and monitoring costs will tend to 
fall as the group of farmers becomes smaller and more homogeneous.
Hence farmers in developed countries, who are relatively few, will be better able to solve the 
free-rider problem and lobby effectively for support than their more numerous counterparts in 
developing countries. By the same token, as the non-farm population grows in the course of devel-
opment it will become increasingly large, heterogeneous and, therefore, ineffective in lobbying 
against support for farmers. In addition, the beneﬁ ts of agricultural support become increasingly 
concentrated on a small number of increasingly specialised farmers as their number falls in the 
course of development. Hence, each farmer has an increasingly powerful incentive to lobby for 
support policies. Conversely, as the costs of providing this support are diluted over an increas-
ingly large non-farm population in the course of development, political resistance to agricultural 
support can be expected to fade.
Olson’s theory relates the size of the farm population to the ‘demand’ for support that farmers 
are able to express on the ‘market’ for political support. In simpliﬁ ed form, this theory predicts 
that the amount of support that is provided to farmers in a country is a decreasing function of the 
number of farmers in that country:
(1) Support = ƒ (Number of farmers)      
In this equation, ƒ is a mathematical function that translates increasing numbers of farmers into 
decreasing levels of agricultural support. In recent decades, political-economic insights such as 
Olson’s have been used to identify other demand-side determinants of agricultural policy. For 
example, all other things being equal one might expect that farmers will demand less support in 
countries where the climate and soil conditions are more favourable for farming. In addition, fac-
tors on the supply-side that inﬂ uence a government’s ability to meet farmers’ demand for support 
have also been identiﬁ ed. For example, it has been hypothesised that a government’s ability to 
pay for expensive agricultural support will decline as its level of indebtedness increases. Hence, 
the simple conceptual model in equation (1) above has been extended to account for a variety of 
demand and supply factors that can inﬂ uence the amount of support provided to agriculture:
(2) Support = ƒ (Demand-side determinants, Supply-side determinants) 
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Economists have estimated the shape and the strength of the functional relationship ƒ in equa-
tion (2) in a number of studies.4 Not surprisingly, these studies have shown that observed agri-
cultural policy choices are not fully predictable: because of history, culture, ideology, and path 
dependency, each country’s agricultural policy is unique. Nevertheless, these studies show that 
agricultural policy choices are inﬂ uenced in a predictable manner by key determinants that are 
able to explain much of the variation in agricultural support between countries. 
4  Appendix Table 1 provides an overview of these studies. Most have focused on explaining not agricultural support in general but rather the level of 
protection that is provided to farm products, i.e. the ratio of domestic prices for farm products to the corresponding world market prices. 
Figure 2: Financial contributions to and receipts from the CAP in 2009, 
from the largest net contributor (Germany) to the largest net recipient (Poland)
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The basic model
We draw on this conceptual framework and past research to develop and estimate a model that 
explains public expenditure on NAPs in a set of non-EU OECD countries. We then use this esti-
mated model to predict the levels of public expenditure on agricultural support policies that 
would prevail in the EU member states if there were no CAP. Hence, the model that we wish to 
estimate and use to simulate hypothetical public expenditures on NAPs is:
(3) Public expenditure = ƒ (Demand-side determinants, Supply-side determinants)
Estimating the model in equation (3) is not straightforward because public expenditure only 
accounts for some of the support that is provided to farmers. In addition to the support that is 
provided directly by public expenditure (i.e. in the form of direct payments to farmers), sup-
port can also be provided indirectly by market policies (for example import tariffs) that make 
consumers pay higher prices for farm products. While public expenditure is ultimately ﬁ nanced 
by taxpayers, the burden of price policies is borne by consumers, who are obliged to pay more 
for food than they otherwise would. These two groups, consumers and taxpayers, clearly overlap, 
but they are not identical.
Figure 3: The basic model 
Source: Own illustration
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Any desired level of support for farmers can be generated by different combinations of pub-
lic expenditure and market policy. Which combination a country implements will depend on 
economic and political factors. From a distributional perspective, providing support via pub-
lic expenditure has the advantage of being progressive if a country’s tax system is such that 
wealthier citizens pay higher taxes. In contrast, providing support to farmers via market policy 
is regressive because low income consumers spend higher shares of their incomes on food. How-
ever, public expenditure to support farmers is generally more transparent than support in the 
form of market policy. Public expenditure to support farmers is visible as an aggregate item in 
the government’s budget, whereas indirect support via higher prices is spread out thinly over 
many consumers and their many individual food purchases.5 All other things being equal, there-
fore, farmers might for strategic reasons prefer to receive a given amount of support via market 
policy rather than public expenditure.
The relationship between public expenditure and market policy as means of channelling support 
to farmers is complex. Consider a country that uses market policy to support domestic farm 
prices at a certain level above world market prices. In a net import situation it can apply an import 
tariff to boost prices. This will burden consumers and beneﬁ t farmers, but it will also generate 
tariff revenue for the government. This ’negative public expenditure’ will beneﬁ t taxpayers. How-
ever, if domestic prices are supported above world market prices in a net export situation, then 
the government must either subsidize exports or purchase and destroy (or otherwise remove) 
produce from the market. Consumers are burdened and farmers beneﬁ t as in the net import 
situation, but now additional public expenditure is required to subsidise exports or otherwise 
remove excess production. Hence, the same market policy can either increase or reduce the level 
of public expenditure, depending on the speciﬁ c setting in which it is implemented.
To account for the interaction between the different sources of support to farmers, we must include 
the level of market policy support in the equation that explains public expenditure support:
(4) Public exp. = 1 (Demand-side determinants, Supply-side determinants, 
 Market policy support)      
Estimating this equation is challenging and requires the use of appropriate econometric tech-
niques. The challenge arises from the fact that market policy support is also determined by a set 
of demand-side and supply-side determinants, and both inﬂ uences and is inﬂ uenced by public 
expenditure (Figure 3). We account for this by using a method known as two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) that is commonly used in such settings.
5  Since farm products only account for a share of the final price of food, and since consumers in industrialised countries spend a relatively small share of their 
incomes on food, farm price support will typically add only a negligible amount to a typical food shopping bill. In 2011, food accounted for 11.5 percent 
of consumer expenditure in Germany, and the farm gate cost of raw agricultural products accounted for just over one-quarter of final consumer spending 
on bread, potatoes, sugar, meat, dairy products, and eggs (Deutscher Bauernverband, 2012). 
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To estimate the model in equation (4) we require data on public expenditure to support agricul-
ture, on the market policies that support agriculture, and on the demand-side and supply-side 
determinants of support. The following section explains the data and variables that we employ. 
Appendix Table 2 provides detailed deﬁ nitions and descriptive statistics.
Measuring public expenditure and market policies that support agriculture
The OECD has been publishing information on the agricultural policies of its members since the 
mid-1980s. A key result of this effort is the producer support estimate (PSE), which is deﬁ ned 
as “an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers 
to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that sup-
port agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income” 
(OECD 2010: 17).
Using detailed information on the composition of the PSE that is published by the OECD, we iso-
late that component of the PSE that is due to public expenditure, and that component that is due 
to market policies. This results in two variables. One is PublicExp, which measures budgetary 
transfers to agricultural producers plus any implicit transfers that are based on public revenue 
foregone (i.e. due to tax concessions to farmers). The other is MarketPolicy, which measures all 
transfers from consumers to agricultural producers (referred to as TCP1 in OECD PSE database). 
PublicExp is the variable on the left-hand-side of equation (4) that we wish to explain, and Mar-
ketPolicy is one of the explanatory variables on the right-hand-side of equation (4) that explains 
PublicExp. We divide both PublicExp and MarketPolicy (which are expressed in million US$ 
in the OECD’s PSE database) by the GDP of the country in question so that these measures of 
agricultural support that can be compared across countries of different sizes.
Demand-side determinants of support
In past research, many factors have been found to inﬂ uence the level of farm support. As is 
always the case in studies such as this, the choice of factors is driven by theoretical consider-
ations but also by data availability. Including more factors can increase the explanatory power 
of our model, but only if data on those factors are available for all of the countries and years that 
we wish to consider.
The relative size of the agricultural population: To test Olson’s logic of collective action, we include a 
variable that measures the share of a country’s population that lives in agricultural households. As 
this share increases, the more difﬁ cult it becomes for farmers to overcome the free-riding problem 
associated with lobbying and, hence, the less demand for support policies farmers are able to express.
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The income gap between agriculture and non-agriculture: If farm incomes lag behind incomes in 
the rest of the economy, the demand for redistributive policies that beneﬁ t farmers is expected 
to increase. To capture this we use the ratio of per capita GDP in agriculture to per capita GDP in 
the rest of the economy.
The comparative advantage of agriculture: The more favourable the geographic and climatic con-
ditions for agriculture in a country, the less farmers in that country will demand policies that 
support agriculture. We therefore include an index of soil quality in our estimations. 
Supply-side determinants of support
Fiscal space: On the supply side, the fiscal situation in a country can be expected to influence 
its ability to implement policies that support agriculture. To capture this, we include the ratio of 
central government debt to GDP. We expect that higher ratios of debt to GDP will be associated 
with reduced support for agriculture, which is typically financed by the central government. We 
also test whether a country’s natural resource wealth might affect its ability to support agricul-
ture. Taxing the rents associated with resource wealth might expand a country’s fiscal space 
and its ability to support agriculture. However, resource wealth has also been associated with 
governance problems that arise from a preoccupation with extracting resource rents rather than 
generating value added. In such an environment, agricultural policy might also focus on extract-
ing rents from agriculture rather than supporting it.6
The relationships between some of these demand- and supply-side determinants and agricultural 
support might be non-linear. For example, agricultural support might increase at a decreasing 
rate as the number of farmers becomes smaller. To account for this we include the variables that 
correspond to these determinants in quadratic as well as linear form in equation (4).
The data sample
We estimate the model in equation (4) using data from a set of 20 non-EU OECD countries over 
25 years from 1986 to 2010. We limit attention to OECD countries because these share similar 
institutions and levels of development with the EU member states for which we wish to simulate 
NAPs.7 If data were available for each of the 20 countries over all of the 25 years between 1986 
and 2010, our dataset would contain 500 observations. However, some countries (e.g. Austria in 
6  Argentina and Russia provide evidence in favour of this conjecture. Both are resource rich and both have in recent years implemented restrictions on cereal 
exports that extract agricultural rents.
7  The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.
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1995) leave the sample when they join the EU. Furthermore, we omit pre-1995 observations for 
the former centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe that later joined the EU 
(e.g. Poland and Hungary). This is because of concerns about data quality, and because agricul-
tural policy making in these countries prior to 1995 was presumably based on institutions and 
conditions that differ fundamentally from those that underlie the rest of the sample. The result-
ing sample contains 354 observations.
Results
The estimated model
The estimation results for our model are presented in Appendix Table 3.8 Overall, the model 
performs well econometrically and produces results that are economically plausible. The model 
is able to explain 80 percent of the variation in the levels of public expenditure on agricultural 
policy between countries and over time in the data. This is stronger than the explanatory power of 
most other studies in the literature that attempt to explain agricultural policies (listed in Appen-
dix Table 1). Moreover, most of the demand-side and supply-side determinants discussed above 
have statistically signiﬁ cant and plausible effects on public expenditure to support agriculture:
· As the ratio of per capita GDP in agriculture falls relative to per capita GDP in the rest of the 
economy, public expenditure on agricultural support increases. This effect, which conﬁ rms our 
theoretical expectations, is signiﬁ cantly non-linear. The model predicts that farmers receive sup-
port as long as their per capita GDP does not exceed that in the rest of the economy by more than 
roughly 40 percent. The highest levels of support, all other things being equal, are provided 
when GDP per capita in agriculture is roughly 70 percent of that in the rest of the economy. 
· The more highly fertile soils a country has, the less it spends on agricultural support. This 
effect is also expected and also signiﬁ cantly non-linear, with the amount of support provided 
increasing disproportionately as fertile soils become scarcer.
· As the share of the agricultural population grows, so does public expenditure on agricultural 
support. This effect runs counter to Olson’s logic of collective action and is therefore unex-
pected. It may be due to the fact that the agricultural population is relatively small in most of 
the OECD countries that we consider; our sample does not cover the full spectrum from least 
developed to highly industrialised country. Hence, the advantages of small group size in terms 
of effective lobbying have perhaps been exhausted in the countries we consider, and our results 
may indicate that further reductions in group size merely reduce a group’s political clout.
· On average, public expenditure on agricultural support is roughly 0.5 percentage points of 
GDP lower in countries with high levels of natural resource wealth. This supports the theory 
8  In the course of estimation we found that the model performed poorly for two countries, New Zealand and Norway. The final model therefore includes 
dummy variables for these countries.
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that resource wealth fosters a culture of rent-extraction that also reduces the propensity to 
support agriculture. Norway is one notable exception to this rule (see footnote 8).
· Higher levels of public debt lead to less public expenditure on agricultural support. All other 
things being equal, a country with a ratio of public debt to GDP of 150 percent will spend 
roughly 0.15 percent less of its GDP on support to agriculture than a country with a public debt 
to GDP ratio of 50 percent.
· The results indicate that market policy is weakly complementary to public expenditure. If 
market policy support to farmers increases by 1 percent of GDP, public expenditure support 
increases by roughly 0.25 percent of GDP.
Simulating expenditure on national policies by the EU member states
We next use the estimated model to simulate expenditure on NAPs in 21 EU member states.9 
To this end, we collect data on the demand-side and supply-side determinants of agricultural 
policy expenditure for each of these member states, and enter these data into our estimate of 
equation (4). This study does this for each of the years from 2004 to 2010, and for each year it 
adds the simulated expenditures on NAPs across the 21 member states.
The results are summarised in Figure 4.10 The differences between CAP expenditure and simu-
lated expenditures on NAPs for the EU 21 are relatively small in most years. The largest dif-
ference, estimated for 2010, amounts to just under 0.2 percent of GDP in the EU 21, or roughly 
Euro 23 billion. In most years it does not appear that the CAP has been much more or much less 
expensive that the NAPs that would have replaced it.
That said, these simulations provide some evidence that the CAP is capping agricultural spend-
ing in the EU in recent years. From 2004 to 2006, the CAP was more expensive than or roughly 
as expensive as the simulated NAPs; since 2007 the simulated NAPs have been consistently 
more expensive that the CAP. In the ﬁ rst decades of the CAP, when the EU’s budget grew rapidly, 
the common-pool problem and the resulting propensity to adopt increasingly expensive support 
measures went largely unchecked. Increasingly, however, limits on the growth of the EU budget, 
and on the share of CAP spending in that budget, may have disciplined agricultural policy and 
provided a counterweight to national preferences for higher levels of agricultural protection and 
support. In addition, peaking prices for agricultural commodities in 2007 and from 2010 onward 
have weakened the case for farm support.
9  These member states are the EU 15 plus the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Missing data preclude simulation for the 
remaining member states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania). The EU 21 accounted for over 98 percent of the EU’s GDP in 2009.
10  The simulations depicted in Figure 4 are based on econometric estimates that are subject to uncertainty. The confidence intervals around our simulated 
EU-21 NAP expenditures are wide, which means that these expenditures could be considerably higher or lower than the most likely values presented in 
Figure 4. Using these confidence intervals we can determine that simulated expenditure on NAPs in 2010, for example, is higher than actual expenditure 
on the CAP with 74 percent probability.
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In Figure 5, actual 2009 CAP contributions and receipts, and simulated 2009 NAP expenditure 
is compared for each of the 21 member states. The aggregated results presented in Figure 4 above 
show that difference between actual CAP expenditure and simulated NAP expenditures for the 
EU-21 amounted to Euro 4.5 billion in 2009. Hence, replacing the CAP with NAPs in 2009 would 
have increased expenditure in some member states and reduced it in others, with the aggregate gains 
and losses for the EU as a whole roughly balancing. Using 2009 as a basis for comparison therefore 
highlights the redistribution in public expenditure between member states that is caused by the CAP. 
Two comparisons are made. First, Figure 5 compares simulated NAP expenditure in 2009 with 
what each member state actually contributed to CAP expenditure in 2009. This comparison 
shows how much the ministry of ﬁ nance in each member state could save (or how much more it 
would spend) if the CAP were replaced by national policies. Second, simulated NAP expenditure 
is also compared with the receipts that each member state received due to the CAP in 2009. 
This comparison shows how much more (or less) farmers in each member state would receive if 
the CAP were replaced by national policies.11
11  The simulated NAP expenditures in Figure 4 are also estimates and, hence, subject to uncertainty.
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According to the simulations, Germany, for example, would have spent roughly Euro 300 million 
less on a NAP than it contributed to ﬁ nancing the CAP in 2009. In other words, renationalising agri-
cultural policy would have saved Germany some money. In addition, all of the money that Germany 
would have spent on its NAP would have accrued to German agriculture, whereas under the CAP 
almost one-third of its contribution is transferred to other countries. Hence, replacing the CAP with 
a NAP would not only have reduced German agricultural policy expenditure by Euro 300 million, 
it would also have increased the amount of support provided to German farmers, by almost Euro 3 
billion. The situation in the UK and to some extent Italy is similar. The shift to a NAP would have 
increased support to domestic farmers in these countries primarily by reducing the amounts that 
they currently contribute to support agriculture in other member states. 
The situation in France differs from that in Germany, Italy, and the UK. According to the simula-
tion, France would have spent roughly Euro 1 billion more on a NAP than it contributed to the 
CAP in 2009. One half of this amount would have replaced net receipts of roughly Euro 500 
million that France received from the CAP in 2009, and the other half would have represented 
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increased support for agriculture in France. Given the freedom to determine its own agricultural 
policy, the simulations suggest that France would opt for, and pay for, higher levels of support.
The Netherlands and Sweden stand out as countries that, like France, would have spent consider-
ably more on NAPs than they contributed to the CAP in 2009 (Euro 1.1 and Euro 0.6 billion more, 
respectively). However, like Germany, both are net contributors to the CAP, so shifting to NAPs 
would have greatly increased the support provided to their farmers (more than doubling it in the 
case of the Netherlands). Spain, Greece, Hungary, and Ireland would have spent roughly as much 
on NAPs as they contributed to the CAP in 2009, but since they are all major net recipients from 
the CAP, the shift to NAPs would lead to large reductions in agricultural support. 
Poland is unique in that it would have spent considerably more on a NAP than it contributed 
to the CAP in 2009, but nevertheless would have provided its farmers with considerably less 
support than they received from the CAP. While farmers in Spain, Greece, Hungary, and Ireland 
would receive roughly as much support under NAPs as their governments currently contribute to 
the CAP, it appears that farmers in Poland would be able to persuade their government to spend 
much more on a NAP than it is currently contributing to the CAP.
Conclusions
This study has compared the actual level of public expenditure on agricultural support in the 
EU with the hypothetical level that would result if each member state were to implement its own 
national agricultural policy. It proceeded in two steps, ﬁ rst proposing a model of the determi-
nants of public expenditure that is based on insights from the literature on the political econom-
ics of agricultural policy making, and estimating this model econometrically using data from 20 
non-EU OECD members between 1986 and 2010. Second, it used the results of this estimation to 
simulate the levels of public expenditure on national agricultural policies that 21 EU countries 
would choose if there were no CAP. 
One clear result emerges from the analysis. Overall we do not ﬁ nd that the CAP has greatly 
increased or reduced public expenditure on agriculture compared with the national agricultural 
policies that would have replaced it. However there is some indication that in recent years the 
CAP has begun to cap expenditure on agricultural policy. National agricultural policies would 
have cost roughly Euro 23 billion more in 2010 than was spent on the CAP in that year. While 
the common pool problem may have inﬂ ated spending on agriculture in the early decades of the 
CAP, budget ceilings and the growing importance of policy areas other than agriculture in the 
EU may be helping agricultural policy makers to resist pressures for more protection and support 
at the national level.
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To put these results in perspective several points should be made. First, the model that we use to 
simulate national agricultural policy expenditures appears to be robust and plausible. However, 
it is subject to the weaknesses that are associated with all such models. In particular, while it is 
able to explain a large portion of the observed variation in agricultural policy spending over time 
and across non-EU OECD countries, it does not explain all of this variation. Agricultural policy 
choices are inﬂ uenced by additional factors and by national idiosyncrasies that we have not been 
able to consider. Furthermore, our model generates simulations that are subject to large margins 
of error and must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Second, our analysis does not take international agricultural policy coordination into account. 
The national agricultural policies that would replace the CAP would also be subject to WTO 
disciplines on the types and levels of policy measures that governments are permitted to apply. 
National agricultural policy choices would presumably be limited by the need to maintain an 
EU-wide customs union, which would preclude measures such as price support at the national 
level. In the absence of a CAP, some member states (the Benelux countries, perhaps) might even 
decide to implement regional agricultural policies. All of these factors might restrict national 
agricultural policy choices in ways that our model is not able to capture.
Finally, the ﬁ nding that the CAP may be capping public expenditure on agricultural support in 
recent years does not necessarily mean that the CAP produces EAV. There is some indication that 
the CAP is producing one speciﬁ c type of EAV that is sometimes attributed to it: policy coordina-
tion that reduces political-economic distortions and limits subsidy races. However, our ﬁ ndings 
do not generate any insights into whether the CAP provides other types of EAV. Defenders of the 
CAP will argue that it also generates a range of public goods that national policies would not 
generate; critics can point to a variety of public bads and inefﬁ ciencies.
Of course, the national agricultural policies that we simulate are hypothetical. As the com-
parison of actual CAP expenditure and simulated national policy expenditures in 2009 shows 
(Figure 5), shifting to national agricultural policies would result in a signiﬁ cant redistribution 
of ﬁ scal burdens and agricultural spending among the member states. Hence, renationalisation 
of the CAP would seriously disturb the delicate juste retour balance that has emerged from count-
less negotiations and compromises over the history of the EU. As the recent EU budget negotia-
tions in February 2013 have highlighted once more, the need to maintain this balance largely 
deﬁ nes what can and what cannot be achieved in EU policy making. For this reason, it is highly 
unlikely that the member states would ever agree to renationalise agricultural policy, regardless 
of whether this would lead to more or less European value added.
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Appendix
Table Appendix 1: A review of empirical studies of the determinants of agricultural policy
Source: Own illustration
Paper Data
Dependent 
Variables Independent Variables
Beghin & Kherallah (1994) 1982 – 1987 25 industrial countries × × × × × × ×
Homma & Hayami (1986) 1955 – 1980 10 industrial countries × × ×
Inhwan (2008) 1986 – 2004 23 industrial countries × × × ×
Jonsson (2007) 1986 – 2003 Euro-group × ×
Masters and Garcia (2010) 1995 – 2007 68 industrial countries × × × ×
Olper (1998) 1975 – 1989 8 EU countries × × × ×
Olper (2001) 1982 – 1992
35 developed & 
developing
× × × × ×
Swinnen  et al. (2000) 1972 – 1985 37 industrial countries × × ×
Swinnen et al. (2001)
1977 – 1985 
(PSE percent) 1990 (NPC)
Belgium × × ×
Thies & Porche (2007) 1986 – 2001 30 industrial countries × × × ×
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Dependent variable PublicExp
Independent variables Coeffi cient Standard error Signifi cance‡
Constant 0.2811 0.2187
AgGDP/NonAgGDP 1.1088 0.3897 ***
(AgGDP/NonAgGDP)² – 0.8056 0.3035 ***
ShareAgPop 0.0416 0.0055 ***
SoilSuitable – 0.0499 0.0147 ***
(SoilSuitable)² 0.0016 0.0005 ***
ResourceWealth – 0.4854 0.0898 ***
GovDebt – 0.0015 0.0004 ***
Dummy (New Zealand) – 0.7528 0.1128 ***
Dummy (Norway) 0.7416 0.0964 ***
MarketPolicy 0.2482 0.0681 ***
Number of observations 354
R² 0.801 (0.796 adjusted)
† Estimated using 2SLS. As identifying restrictions we assume that MarketPolicy (but not PublicExp) is infl uenced by per capital income and 
by year fi xed effects that account for annual variation in conditions on world markets for agricultural products.
‡***, ** and * denote signifi cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Table Appendix 3: Regression results†
Source: Own illustration
Group Variable Description Units Min. Max. Mean Std. dev.
Dependent variable
PublicExp
Public expenditure on agricultural 
policy (PSE-TPC1)/GDP
percent of GDP 0.02 3.31 0.79 0.62
MarketPolicy
Transfers from consumers to 
producers (TCP1/GDP)
percent of GDP – 0.53 6.15 0.81 0.97
Demand-side determinant
ShareAgPop Share of agriculture in total population percent 1.66 36.99 10.06 8.29
AgGDP/NonAgGDP
Ratio of GDP per capita in agriculture 
to GDP per capita in rest of economy
Ratio 0.16 1.24 0.55 0.25
SoilSuitable Share of very fertile soil in total land area percent 1.13 26.33 12.10 7.25
Supply-side determinant
GovDept Ratio of central government dept to GDP percent 4.10 183.53 37.55 28.47
ResourceWealth
Dummy = 1 if fossil fuel, mineral & forests 
rents > 4.36 percent of GDP (>90th 
percentile in sample)
Dummy (1/0) 0 1 0.21 0.41
Table Appendix 2: Description of the variables used to model public expenditure on agricultural policy
Source: Own illustration
56
Case Study 2: Embassies
Friedrich Heinemann, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, Steffen Osterloh, Stefani Weiss
Foreign policy is the classic textbook case for a typical nation-wide public good in federal coun-
tries. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that this policy plays a role wherever ﬁ scal federal-
ism approaches are applied to the EU and its budget. It appears straightforward that Europe could 
realize considerable economies of scale if it assigns foreign policy-related tasks to the European 
level. Ongoing global trends like climate change, migration pressure, and globalization of mar-
kets underline the argument: Europe as a uniﬁ ed player should be more inﬂ uential compared to 
the fragmented role of 27 national players in inﬂ uencing these trends (ECORYS et al. 2008: ch. 
18.5). Uncoordinated national activities are confronted with numerous spillover problems which 
may result in freeriding and the suboptimal provision of international activities. Therefore, for-
eign relations are regularly emphasized as one of the priorities for future reallocations in the 
European budget.2
However, plausible textbook cases often do not stand up to the challenges of a practical appli-
cation with all its complexities. And the big and obvious problem with the Europeanisation of 
One Embassy 
with 27 Flags – The 
Potential Benefits from 
European International 
Representations1
1  Research assistance by Laura Renner and Philipp Bach is gratefully acknowledged. We also are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Vasco Cal, 
Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Tom De Bruijn, Hilmar Linnenkamp, Hans Pitlik, Wilhelm Schönfelder, Michaele Schreyer, Robert 
Schwager and Fabian Zuleeg. 
2  “In contrast, there are areas in which EU involvement is probably too limited. For instance, one would think that defense and foreign relations is a policy area 
typically allocated to the highest level of government. Instead, the EU has a limited (although growing) role in these areas” (Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 
2005: 276/277). Begg (2009: 42) points out that “defence or foreign representations, for instance, exhibit many characteristics that warrant delegation to higher 
levels of government”. Similar arguments can be found in ECORYS et al. (2008) and Gros (2008).
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foreign policy is the undeniable existence of national interests. For instance, Alesina et al. 
(2005: 283) point out that “there are signiﬁ cant economies of scale and externalities to be 
exploited in foreign policy and defence, provided geopolitical interests are similar”. While this 
conclusion states the key assumption for the beneﬁ ts of harmonization, i.e. the homogeneity of 
interests, this homogeneity of foreign policy interests will often not exist. As a heritage of the 
colonial era or the cold war history, European countries often have individualistic approaches 
towards certain countries or world regions which could never be adequately reﬂ ected by a 
homogeneous EU foreign policy. The trade-off between a potential European added value and 
sensitive limitations of national sovereignty also poses problems for quantiﬁ cation. Even if 
data would allow calculating the potential costs savings from a far-reaching transfer of for-
eign policy competencies to the European level, any such result would hardly be taken serious 
in the political debate. Therefore, meaningful quantiﬁ cations must take account of the fact 
that certain dimensions of international relations will remain (also) a national activity for the 
foreseeable future. And, if possible, quantiﬁ cations should provide a range of potential costs 
savings conditional on different options of Europeanisation.
This case study tries to meet this quantiﬁ cation challenge through a focused and differenti-
ated research strategy. The approach is focused since it concentrates on a well-deﬁ ned part of 
foreign policy activities: the provision of international representations covering embassies and 
consulates.
In a naïve approach, one could now simply compare the expenditures of the current diplomatic 
missions in Europe to the costs of a mutualized diplomatic service which could, for example, 
be the European External Action Service (EEAS). This approach would be naïve because an 
organization like the EEAS provides a very different bundle of services compared to national 
representations. Hence, a more complex scenario has to be applied. Our approach is differen-
tiated along two dimensions. First, it analyses potential beneﬁ ts from a European provision 
both at the output and the cost side. On the output side, European representatives could offer 
European citizens a more complete worldwide coverage. On the cost side, the provision could 
beneﬁ t from substantial economies of scale. The second differentiation includes the calculation 
of potential cost savings for different degrees of a possible European provision of the policy 
ﬁ eld under scrutiny. It is thus possible to show to which extent European money could create 
added value on a scale from a low to a high degree of Europeanisation in the provision of 
international representations. 
The results indicate the existence of a non-trivial cost saving potential of Euro 420 million to 
Euro 1.3 billion annually. This constitutes an efﬁ ciency gain in a range between six percent 
and 19 percent of current national costs.
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Theoretical and legal aspects of a potential 
European added value
Before embarking on the quantiﬁ cation approach, some theoretical reﬂ ections on the sources of 
European added value in diplomatic services and on legal aspects are important. International 
representations offer a whole spectrum of services, which broadly can be classiﬁ ed into two seg-
ments: In the consular ﬁ eld, the representations are the contact point for their nationals abroad or 
for foreigners willing to enter the country, e.g. through the provision of visa. For their nationals 
the representations also provide consular protections whenever they need help in that country. In 
the embassy ﬁ eld, they play a role for the political, economic, cultural or military relations to the 
host country. Embassies also serve as information provider both for the home and host country. 
While the former area of responsibilities is rather targeted at services to the citizens, the latter 
addresses political or economic actors.
Theoretical reasoning
In principle, several sources of European added value could be relevant if Europe would replace 
the national representations with EU representations.
Economies of scale: Today, EU countries have to pay for multiple structures. In many locations a 
large number of EU member countries are present and provide services for EU citizens in numer-
ous facilities (see below). For example, in places like New York and Shanghai, 24 and 21 out of the 
total 27 EU member countries run consulates. Clearly, a pooling of facilities would cut back costs. 
The provision of international representations is associated with minimum ﬁ xed costs, which 
even small and medium countries will have: the cost for real estate, administration, minimum 
staff for functioning consulate services, and related support (general administration, security, 
information technology, etc.). For some of the related functions – e.g. provision of emergency 
assistance – the related public good has the function of insurance with a stochastic occurrence 
of related events (e.g. nationals suffer from losses or theft, fall ill, need legal protection). While 
an EU representation would beneﬁ t from the law of large numbers and would be able to utilize its 
emergency capacities to a large degree, national representations have to provide structures with 
under-utilized capacities.
A realistic modelling of economies of scale must, however, differentiate between different func-
tions: The potential of cost savings is obviously larger for standardized services that are simi-
lar and homogeneous for all EU member countries and lower for highly speciﬁ c services with 
strong national peculiarities. The provision of visas under common EU rules, for example, has 
a larger potential for costs savings compared to the taking care of economic relations where 
national speciﬁ cities (industry structure, export goods) play a role. These differentiations will 
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be addressed in a costing model below. Today, economies of scale are far from fully realized 
although some structures have emerged that try to reap some of the potential cost savings (for 
example, the cooperation of the Scandinavian member countries in the Nordic embassies).
Underprovision: In addition to the problem of an unnecessary cost burden, underprovision of 
representations may occur. Under the regime of national representations, one can assume that a 
national perspective guides the optimization on locations. This means that, for example, a consul-
ate in a certain peripheral US location is only established if its costs stand in some reasonable 
relation to the beneﬁ ts which arise to the nationals who demand services in that remote location. 
National and EU optimization will come to different results for the optimal network of representa-
tion. For some places, the overall beneﬁ ts for EU citizens will be larger than the minimum ﬁ xed 
costs of establishment whereas the national beneﬁ ts may fall short of this cost level. Thus, the 
national network will end up with a density which is lower compared to the optimization outcome 
of a European approach. This is a special example of Oates’ general insight, “It does not become 
desirable to provide the good until the population reaches a certain critical size” (Oates 1988: 88). 
Internalization of beneﬁ t spillovers: The underprovision problem is aggravated by the existence 
of positive spillovers. Beneﬁ ts of representation for other EU citizens are hardly important in a 
member state’s reﬂ ection on the use of national money. However, national representations of EU 
member countries produce beneﬁ t spillovers to EU citizens in general, e.g. through the provision of 
assistance in cases of emergency. EU citizens can use other EU countries’ consulates or embassies 
if no own representation is available (see below). The consequences are underprovision and fre-
eriding. Small and medium-sized countries have an incentive to freeride on the consulates of larger 
EU countries. But even the large EU countries might fail to establish consulates in remote places. 
Thus, the provision of consulates can be too low since the overall beneﬁ ts for all EU citizens are 
larger than the costs of a consulate while costs are too high for each single country. But these costs 
are too high for each single country. Cooperation through a common EU structure would be able 
to address these inefﬁ ciencies and contribute to a more efﬁ cient distribution of representations. 
Better quality of diplomatic services: A common diplomatic representation of all 27 EU member 
countries can also improve the overall quality of diplomatic services. Examples of pooling and 
sharing, for instance with respect to the US, show that the information network can be enhanced. 
Based on a European division of labour, an EU ambassador has thus much better information 
capacities as compared to national agents. This will improve the overall quality of diplomatic 
missions, for example concerning intelligence or best practise examples.
These theoretical considerations point to two distinct dimensions for the consequences of EU 
missions: First, there is a cost saving element through the possible cheaper European production 
of the same level of services as before under the national structures. And there is a cost increas-
ing element through a higher density of European representations compared to the national 
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optimization. Although both effects can be regarded as efﬁ ciency enhancing they counteract 
with respect to the budgetary consequences. Our quantitative analysis below will take up this 
differentiation. The detailed costing of the economies of scale argument will be complemented by 
a case study on EU representation density in the US.
Legal preconditions
Before embarking on the quantiﬁ cation of the described effects, some hints to the legal pre-
conditions for the model of an “EU embassy with 27 ﬂ ags” are helpful. Models of regional 
cooperation of member countries that are already practiced indicate that there are no severe 
legal constraints that could prevent member states from establishing representations combin-
ing services for up to 27 member countries. According to the German law on external actions 
(Article 4, Gesetz über den auswärtigen Dienst), for instance, the minister of foreign affairs 
is empowered to conclude agreements on the foundation of common diplomatic missions with 
other countries, especially EU member states. Furthermore, some member states already co-
operate in Common Visa Application Centres, for instance in Chisinau, Moldova; Ljubljana, Slo-
venia; or in Istanbul, Turkey. The networks of Nordic countries as well as those of the Benelux 
states are further examples for such shared visa services (Hobolth 2011).
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has created provisions that explicitly open the door for more 
intense cooperation in the provision of diplomatic services. Article 20 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulates the rights of citizens of the Union to 
“enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals 
is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member 
State on the same conditions as the national of that State.” According to Article 23 TFEU, mem-
ber states are obliged to adopt the necessary provisions so that this highest level of mutual 
protection of EU nationals is achieved. Another legal development clearly pointing into the 
direction of a harmonized European production of diplomatic services is the Common Consular 
Instructions (CCI) for Schengen countries. These instructions have not only led to harmonized 
quality standards for this kind of service but also put an end to non-professional visa provi-
sions through honorary consulates. 
Finally, a distinction of the model of an “EU embassy with 27 ﬂ ags” and the already existing 
EEAS is necessary. The latter was established through the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 27,3 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, TEU) as a “functionally autonomous body of the Union under the 
High Representative” (Council Decision 2010, Article 1). According to this, the EEAS especially 
supports the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy by conduct-
ing his tasks laid out in articles 18 and 27 TEU (e.g. fulﬁ lling the mandate on the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy). Furthermore, the EEAS shall assist the European Council 
61
Case Study 2: Embassies
as well as the European Commission in the area of external relations. Diplomatic services of 
the member states shall cooperate with the EEAS, especially in delegations in third countries 
or international organizations. In accordance with the High Representative of the European 
Union it is further possible to open delegations that then represent the European Union. The 
delegations are further obliged to share information with member states’ diplomatic services 
and, if it is wanted, “support the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their role 
of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-
neutral basis” (Council Decision 2010: Article 5). As an independent provision of visa or similar 
diplomatic services is not planned, however, the focus is primarily on EU interests. That is, 
the EEAS is rather a service for a broader common policy and representation of the EU in 
third countries than a substitute for national diplomatic services or delegations. In spite of the 
existence of the EEAS, all EU member countries possess a worldwide network of embassies and 
consulates. Thus, the EEAS with its current objectives and construction does not yet promise 
substantial realization of European economies of scale. 
Summing up, there are good theoretical arguments that substantial resources could be saved 
(and/or the provision of representations be improved) if a uniﬁ ed European network of inter-
national representations replaces the uncoordinated national networks. However, even if 
analytically sound cost arguments point towards a European provision of public services, 
political fundamentals can potentially counteract the implementation. Foreign and defence 
policies enable a nation to deﬁ ne what it stands for and represent the values and preferences 
of the nation’s citizens. The EU thus “cannot expect to intrude in these areas just because 
economies of scale might make it more effective in delivering policy” (Begg 2009: 42). The 
quantiﬁ cation of the potential added value, however, is an important contribution for a better 
informed optimization decision on the trade-off between potential cost savings and national 
autonomy.
Potential for centralisation
Tasks and services of embassies and consulates
The main tasks of consulates and the consular section of embassies are to represent the 
home country and its citizens, to protect their interests, and to foster the various relation-
ships between the sending and the receiving country. Besides visa and passport authority, 
the consulates and embassies inform their sending country about current developments and 
have several administrative tasks. A trade and economic section aims at enhancing trade and 
supports national enterprises in their activities in the receiving country whereas cultural ser-
vices should develop exchange and inform the receiving country about the sending country. 
The main difference between consulates and embassies is in the different sphere of action: 
While consulates have a rather regional focus, embassies are broadly aligned and additionally 
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foster political relations to their host country. A full list of tasks is stipulated in Article 5 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (completed 24 April 1963, see WÜK 1963):
· Protection of the home country’s interests (and citizens abroad);
· Development and cultivation of economic, cultural, and scientiﬁ c relations 
 between the home country and the receiving country;
· Information on the development of the receiving country;
· Support and help for citizens of the home country in the receiving country;
· Passports, etc., for citizens of the home country and visa (or other required 
 documents) for citizens of the receiving country who want to enter the home country;
· Administration and notarial tasks according to laws in the receiving country;
· Protection of citizens’ interests in inheritance cases;
· Legal support;
· Help by submitting documents;
· Control of ships and aircraft of home country in receiving country; 
· Other tasks determined by national law.
A differentiated view of the communitarisation potential
Based on the aforementioned arguments concerning economies of scale, in a naive approach one 
could argue that saving potentials are the same for every task conducted by a diplomatic mis-
sion. Such a methodology, however, suffers from various drawbacks since both the aims of the 
several diplomatic tasks as well as the underlying costs differ between and within EU member 
states. The question thus is which tasks or sections of a diplomatic mission are best suited for 
communitarisation and which are not?
According to an expert survey that has been accomplished with various current and former 
ambassadors, an exemplary structure of an exemplary representation (see Table 1) has been 
derived. Based on this survey, the main functions of diplomatic missions are assigned to the 
sections consular services, political relations, economic relations and trade promotion, ofﬁ cial 
development aid, military mission, cultural relations, administration, security services, press, 
management, and other services.
Obviously, these functions differ with respect to their likely feasibility of full communitarisa-
tion. Political relations as well as the conduct of economic and trade promotion can have many 
aspects that are speciﬁ c for each EU country. Thus, even in the case of an EU embassy with 
27 ﬂ ags, especially countries with high ambitions for an independent foreign policy or speciﬁ c 
interests in economic relations might like to draw on their own separate and additional staff to 
fulﬁ l the related tasks. The same holds true, albeit to a lesser extent, for development aid and 
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cultural missions. Country-speciﬁ c issues are less relevant for administration, consular services 
like the visa application procedure, or the mission’s security services. For these functions, fewer 
obstacles exist for reaping economies of scale. 
Information on the division of personnel on the different sections of an exemplary EU repre-
sentation is shown in Table 1.3 All ﬁ gures are based on expert assessments of both current and 
former ambassadors for an exemplary EU diplomatic mission of a large, medium, and a small EU 
country. There are obviously enormous differences concerning the overall staff and its division, 
both between and within different EU member countries. Nevertheless, this assessment can 
provide important insights in the different weights of functions in the diplomatic area. As can 
be seen from the table, the proportionally largest share is administration which accounts for 
approximately one-third to 40 percent of a diplomatic mission’s staff. According to the second 
and the third expert, security services only account for approximately one percent of the total 
staff, whereas the ﬁ rst expert assesses security services as a part of administration.
3  In case of a one-man diplomatic mission, we assume that the division of personnel of different sections is equivalent to the apportionment of time the 
consular spends on the different tasks. 
Functions Expert 1* Expert 2 Expert 3
Consular services 10 15 13
Political relations to host country 10 6 18
Economic relations, trade promotion 10 12 17
Offi cial development aid 5 8 18
Military mission 15 4 1
Cultural relations 10 4 1
Administration 30 42 31
Intelligence – 1 –
Security services – 1 1
Press 10 – –
Management – 5 –
Other – 2 –
Notes: Expert 1 refers to a large, Expert 2 refers to a medium and Expert 3 refers to a small EU country. * Security is part of administration.
Table 1: Average distribution of staff in an exemplary representation
Source: Own illustration
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However, although there are some remarkable differences concerning the different expert assess-
ments of several sections, such as military missions or cultural relations, some important simi-
larities emerge. Both the assessed shares of personnel working in the sections consular services 
or administration are comparable across the different expert assessments. Taken together, these 
sections account for 40 percent to approximately 55 percent of an exemplary mission’s overall 
staff.4 The results thus underline that a substantial share of an exemplary diplomatic mission’s 
staff is working in sections for which there is a strong case that communitarisation is feasible. 
These weights will be used in subsequent quantiﬁ cation. A further caveat must be stressed from 
the beginning: Wage levels and an employees’ remuneration differ across different functions 
and between different nations. In most Eastern European and Asian missions, for instance, the 
consulate section is by far the largest section of a representation. Most of the employees, however, 
are regional staff and are remunerated according to the wage levels of the local market. In a 
developing country it is thus possible that the mission’s consul alone is more expensive than the 
total regional staff employed. The same also holds true for the remaining administrative tasks.
In addition, one has to account for wage differentials on the national and the supranational level. 
If, for instance, most of the employees of a common EU diplomatic mission are paid with EU-
wages, the saving potential shrinks as compared to a situation with national wages to the extent 
EU wages exceed the average wages of national staff across EU member countries. For instance, 
EU ofﬁ cials who have to leave their home country to fulﬁ l their speciﬁ ed tasks in the European 
Commission earn a 16 percent expatriation allowance (Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), Art 
69). Additionally, Gräßle (2013) has shown that there is a huge difference in net earnings between 
national and EU ofﬁ cials. That is, to end up with the net income of a European ofﬁ cial, the gross 
income of a national public servant must increase by additional Euro 6,337.92.5 We will come back 
to this problem in our conclusions.
4  This also holds if one includes security services to administration, which is done by Expert 1.
5  This difference stems from both differences in taxes and special allowances. The figure refers to grade 16, age bracket three and compares European and 
German public servants with two children (Gräßle 2013).
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Quantification of European added value 
of a common EU diplomacy
 
Based on the aforementioned deliberations on cost saving potentials, it is now possible to calcu-
late the potential European added value of a common EU representation. One starts with a focus 
on the cost saving potentials through replacing the multitude of national representations by joint 
EU 27 missions. Here, there are several steps. A ﬁ rst ‘naïve’ approach is based on a simple count-
ing of missions. A second more reﬁ ned approach applies a costing model which takes account 
of the functional differentiation of a mission’s services introduced above. Thus it is possible to 
quantify a range of possible cost savings: from an optimistic counting scenario to a rather cau-
tious costing model.
Finally there is a case study scenario for EU representations in the US to shed light on the other 
side of the coin. In this approach, it can be seen that the services for European citizens can be 
improved with an EU planning of locations as compared to the current situation in which each 
EU member state decides on its own.
Cost-saving potential of EU missions
For the quantiﬁ cation of cost-saving potentials there is a unique dataset which comprises all 
embassies and consulates of all EU 27 member states in 2011 (see Table 2). The data reveal that 
the number of embassies and consulates increases with population size. In other words, smaller 
countries are less well represented as compared to larger EU member states. This indicates that 
political and economic needs to be represented by an embassy do not in all cases compensate 
for the high ﬁ xed costs of having a representation. This especially holds true for the smaller EU 
member states.
A simple accounting exercise already points towards economies of scale which larger countries 
might achieve in that ﬁ eld. Clearly, the number of missions does not increase in proportion with 
the size of the population. The larger a country’s population, the more taxpayers can contribute to 
ﬁ nance each single diplomatic mission. For example, the ratio between the number of population 
and the number of embassies in 2011 amounts to 17,955 for Malta, 80,026 for Ireland, 368,653 for 
Spain and 537,515 for Germany (Table 2).
Of course, these comparisons may disguise high differences in the costs of a mission with a 
larger country’s mission being more costly. Some simple calculations reveal, however, that a cost 
advantage of large countries seems to persist. The unit costs per diplomatic mission amount, for 
example, to Euro 0.8 million for Malta and to Euro 3.9 million for Germany (Emerson et al. 2011). 
The factor 30 in the population-embassy-ratio differential is, for this case, only confronted with 
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EU Member State Embassies Citizens/Embassy Consulates Citizens/Consulate
Luxembourg 20 25,292 5 101,166
Malta 23 17,955 4 103,240
Estonia 32 41,864 2 669,823
Latvia 35 64,083 3 747,639
Slovenia 41 50,069 8 256,603
Lithuania 42 79,063 7 474,379
Cyprus 46 23,992 4 275,912
Ireland 56 80,026 8 560,179
Slovakia 57 95,324 0 –
Finland 75 71,515 8 670,453
Hungary 75 133,449 16 625,544
Portugal 77 138,219 44 241,883
Bulgaria 78 96,709 16 471,458
Czech Republic 82 128,355 16 657,818
Austria 84 99,818 11 762,250
Greece 85 133,165 44 257,251
Poland 90 424,305 37 1,032,094
Romania 92 233,065 37 579,514
Sweden 93 100,851 14 669,937
Belgium 95 114,517 28 388,541
Denmark 104 53.309 31 178,843
Netherlands 115 144,454 25 664,489
Italy 123 491,736 78 775,430
Spain 125 368,653 63 731,454
UK 149 417,576 68 914,982
Germany 152 537,515 61 1,339,382
France 160 405,479 70 926,809
EU 183 2,737,705 227 2,207,048
Total (excluding EU) 2,206 708
Total (including EU) 2,389 935
Table 2: Embassies and consulates per EU member state
Source: Own illustration
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a factor ﬁ ve cost-mission-differential. Taken together, these data indicate the presence of econo-
mies of scale in the provision of diplomatic services, even if one takes into account that larger 
member states hold more diplomatic missions available.
Our ﬁ rst calculation step is informative but naïve, since it only compares the number of diplo-
matic missions but does not account for differences in the scope and scale of diplomatic services 
provided per mission. Given the data at hand, one could now calculate the number of embassies 
and consulates that are redundant if there is one common EU representation fulﬁ lling all func-
tions of the former national representations. One applies a simple algorithm to deﬁ ne the optimal 
network of EU representations in such a way that an EU representation would be present in each 
country (embassy) and city (consulate) where today at least one national representation exists. 
Then one can compare the number of national representations today with this ‘optimal’ EU net-
work. The results reveal enormous redundancies (see Figure 1). While all EU member states 
together had 2,206 embassies worldwide in 2011 (see also Table 2), exactly 2,023 embassies 
could be saved. As for consulates, 483 of the existing consulates can be identiﬁ ed as redundant. 
However, as pointed out before, this calculation is naïve due to two limitations: First, it does not 
yet imply any information on the cost comparison between a ﬁ ctitious EU representation and an 
existing national representation. Second, it does not account for the fact that from an EU perspec-
tive a larger network with better spatial coverage could be optimal.
The next step, therefore, requires a more precise costing of these saving potentials and includes 
the costing of the counterfactual, which is a hypothetical common EU representation. Based on 
the aforementioned arguments concerning the existence of economies of scale, one can now 
Source: Own illustration
Figure 1: Saving Potentials: Number of embassies and consulates
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calculate the cost of the counterfactual on the assumption that the EU can provide missions with 
the same cost conditions as a ﬁ ctitious single member state with 501 million citizens. 
The diplomacy costs per capita depending on a country’s population size are shown in Figure 2. 
Although the overall diplomacy costs per country increase with population size, e.g. Euro 73 mil-
lion in Slovenia vs. Euro 320 million in Sweden vs. Euro 873 million in Germany (Emerson et al. 
2011), a clear pattern concerning the per capita costs emerge. The larger a country’s population 
is, the lower are the per capita diplomacy costs.6
Now it is possible to derive the hypothetical costs per capita: if not of the single member states 
then for the EU as a single actor providing diplomacy services. Since the relation between the 
different EU member states is not linear, i.e. the decrease in per capita costs slows down the 
larger the population is, one employs a power function to estimate the ﬁ tted line of the different 
data points. Based on this function, it is possible to derive the hypothetical diplomacy costs per 
capita of a common EU representation.
6  Since countries that are very small with respect to population size might bias the estimation of the power function, the following countries are excluded: Cyprus, 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia. We thank Robert Schwager for this comment. Furthermore, data for Greece are not available. 
Figure 2: Diplomacy costs for missions per capita in relation to population
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Plugging in the EU population of 501 million people, the diplomacy costs per capita is Euro 
5.04. However, extrapolating the trend line from the German population, which is the largest 
value with around 82 million inhabitants, to the EU’s population of around 501 million may be 
questionable. There is no cost information for countries larger than Germany and thus it is not 
possible to prove that economies of scale would continue far above the German population size. 
One may therefore also employ a more conservative scenario and use the hypothetical value of 
diplomacy cost per capita which emerges for a population of 100 million inhabitants (= Euro 9.01 
diplomacy costs per capita). While the costs saving potentials are presented for both per capita 
cost values, we argue in favour of the conservative estimation to prevent overoptimistic results.
As a next step, we now calculate the overall costs of a hypothetical European diplomacy. There-
fore, we multiply the per capita costs derived before with the EU population. These values are 
then compared with the actual costs of the sum of all different national diplomacies based on data 
from Emerson et al. (2011).7
The results reveal saving potentials of a common EU representation compared to single member 
state representation which range from 4,448 million euro (optimistic scenario) to Euro 2,461 mil-
lion (conservative scenario). This amounts to 63.8 percent of total current cost for the optimistic 
scenario and 35.3 percent for the conservative scenario.
7  To avoid a biased comparison we again exclude Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia. The overall sum of diplomacy 
costs of all single member states, however, changes only slightly from 6,975 to 7,239 if the excluded countries are incorporated. 
Figure 3: Comparison of saving potentials for diplomacy services (costs in million Euro)
Source: Own illustration
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However, a further caveat remains, one that has to be accounted for in order to arrive at a realistic 
quantiﬁ cation. It is reasonable to assume that the full saving potentials (even in the conserva-
tive scenario) cannot be realized. Not all services or duties of the former single member state 
representatives are suitable for full communitarisation. Hence, based on the expert survey on 
the stafﬁ ng of diplomatic missions (see above 3.2), it is possible to calculate different ranges of 
saving potentials for three distinct scenarios.8 In the cautious scenario it is assumed that saving 
potentials can only be realized in the section’s consular services and administration, and account 
for 50 percent (consular services) and 40 percent (administration) of the respective section’s 
hypothetical savings potential.9  
In the conﬁ dent scenario, by contrast, saving potentials can additionally be realized in the ﬁ elds 
of development aid, cultural relations, military missions, and press. Furthermore, the respective 
shares of consular services and administration increase. The same holds true for the optimistic 
scenario, where all shares with exception of military missions increase. However, while it is 
assumed that in the area of consular services the full saving potentials can be realized, one 
cannot account for potential additional costs in administration and therefore we only assume a 
communitarisation share of 80 percent in the optimistic scenario. This is due to the fact that, for 
instance, additional costs for text translations or language skills of the missions’ staff may arise 
which would not have been necessary without communitarisation.
8  We use the staffing numbers for a representative foreign embassy/consulate provided by Expert 1 (large EU member state) and Expert 2 (medium-sized EU 
member state). Note, however, that we also provide ranges for a representative mission of Expert 3 (small EU member state) in the appendix. The overall 
ranges for communitarisation of Expert 1 and Expert 3, however, differ only slightly. 
9  Security services are again part of administration. 
(1)
Division
(2)
Ranges for communitarisation
(3)=(1)×(2)
Saving Potential (%)
Functions of staff (%) cautious confi dent optimistic cautious confi dent optimistic
Consular services 10 0.5 0.7 1 5 7 10
Political relations 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
Economic relations 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development aid 5 0 0.2 0.4 0 1 2
Military mission 15 0 0.2 0.4 0 3 6
Cultural relations 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
Administration 30 0.4 0.6 0.8 12 18 24
Press 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
17 % 35 % 54 %
Table 3: Ranges for communitarisation: Hypothetical mission large-size member state
Source: Own illustration
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These ranges are then multiplied with a section’s proportion of staff. The sum of all saving poten-
tials across the different sections then reveals the overall range for communitarisation. Accord-
ing to the cautious scenario, only 17 percent of the previously calculated saving potentials can 
be realized. The share increases to 35 percent in the conﬁ dent scenario and reaches 54 percent 
in the optimistic scenario.
To offer an interpretation for this calculation, the sum of the overall savings potential can be 
regarded as an indicator to which extent there is a cost disadvantage of an EU representation 
compared to a ﬁ ctitious representation of a homogeneous nation state with 501 million inhab-
itants. The cost disadvantage can result from political or language constraints and forces EU 
representations to produce at larger costs compared to this ﬁ ctitious counterpart. Thus, a saving 
potential of zero percent (100 percent) from this calculation indicates that none (all) of the econo-
mies of scale identiﬁ ed before can be exploited. The zero-percent-case would stand for a situation 
where EU diplomacy requires the same resources as before under national representations.
(1)
Division
(2)
Ranges for communitarisation
(3)=(1)×(2)
Saving Potential (%)
Functions of staff (%) cautious confi dent optimistic cautious confi dent optimistic
Consular services 15 15 0.7 1 7.5 10.5 15
Political relations 6 6 0.2 0.4 0 1.2 2.4
Economic relations 12 12 0 0 0 0 0
Development aid 8 8 0.2 0.4 0 1.6 3.2
Military mission 4 4 0.2 0.4 0 0.8 1.6
Cultural relations 4 4 0.2 0.4 0 0.8 1.6
Administration 42 42 0.6 0.8 16.8 25.2 33.6
Press 0 0 0.2 0.4 0 0 0
Intelligence 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Security services 1 1 0.7 1 0.5 0.7 1
Management 5 5 0.2 0.4 0 1 2
Other 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
24.8 % 41.8 % 60.4 %
Table 4: Ranges for communitarisation: Hypothetical mission of a medium-size member state
Source: Own illustration
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In a next step, it is possible to multiply these different ranges with the result for the conserva-
tive scenario from the previous quantiﬁ cation of saving potentials. Compared to the scenario 
based on the assumption that the full, conservative savings potential of Euro 2,461 million can 
be reached, the more realistic saving potentials now range from Euro 418 million (cautious 
scenario) to Euro 1,329 million (optimistic scenario, see also Figure 4). This amounts to a range 
of six percent up to 19.1 percent of the total current costs for EU diplomatic services (Euro 6,975 
million, Emerson et al., 2011).10 
If one uses the ranges for communitarisation of a medium-size member state’s diplomatic mis-
sion, a slightly different picture emerges. The ranges for saving potentials for such a mission are 
shown in Table 4. Applying the same approach as before, the saving potentials now reach from 
24.8 percent in the cautious scenario up to approximately 60.4 percent in the optimistic scenario. 
Multiplied by the full conservative saving potential of Euro 2,461 million, the realistic saving 
potentials now reach from Euro 610 million (cautious scenario) to Euro 1,486 million (optimistic 
scenario). A graphical summary of the results is shown in Figure 4.
10  Again, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia are excluded.
Figure 4: Realized shares of saving potentials for the conservative scenario (in million Euro)
Source: Own illustration
Large Country
Large Country
Large Country
Medium Country
Medium Country
Medium Country
Confi dent Scenario
Cautious Scenario
Optimistic Scenario
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Saving Potentials
2,461
1,486
1,329
1,029
861
610
418
73
Case Study 2: Embassies
However, a ﬁ nal drawback remains: The analysis so far persists on the assumption that a com-
mon EU representation still pays national wages, i.e. the different wage levels in the different 
countries as well as the differences in remuneration remain under a common regime. It is, how-
ever, questionable whether this will be the case. Here emerges a clear quantitative hint: If the 
establishment of EU missions as a replacement of national structure would be associated with a 
wage increase of diplomats by more than six percent (the lower bound of the savings potential), 
there is a large likelihood that the European solution will not save money. 
However, some arguments point to the fact that the problem of wage increases should be less 
severe than in other ﬁ elds. For instance, most of the saving potentials refer to tasks such as 
administration and consular services. Here it is reasonable to assume that EU representations 
would continue to hire clerks and administrative staff from their host country so that these ser-
vices are still paid with national wages. Furthermore, in the current situation national diplomats 
can beneﬁ t from tax advantages as well as EU staff. This reduces the incentives to move towards 
an EU payment regime.
Added value through improved service quality
If economies of scale in the production of public goods can be realized, this may increase the 
demand for the same public goods since they become cheaper for the taxpayer. From a budget-
ary perspective, this would be a countervailing effect to the expenditure savings of economies 
of scale. However, the welfare interpretation is very different, since both effects are welfare 
enhancing.
Figure 5: Number of consulates in major US cities
Source: Own illustration
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify demand effects. However, a case study approach 
for EU consulates in the US is doable. Here it is plausible that some of the savings from Euro-
pean representations could be invested to arrive at a more even spatial distribution. Figure 5 
reveals that there are large differences between different regions of the US. While all European 
countries are represented in Washington, DC, 24 member states deliver further diplomatic ser-
vices for their citizens in New York, for example. This number further shrinks from 15 nations 
(Chicago) to six nations (Atlanta, Houston, Miami).
This leads to a highly uneven geographical distribution of the diplomatic services which is shown 
in Figure 6. It reveals that in some regions of the US, European diplomatic services are almost 
completely missing (north and northwest) whereas in other regions (southwest, northeast) several 
European nations deliver diplomatic services for their own (and the Union’s) citizens.
This implies potential drawbacks, for instance, for all EU member-state citizens who rely on diplo-
matic services and are located in the middle-north or northwest of the US. From the perspective of 
a European citizen, the resulting extra effort and expense based on this unbalanced distribution is 
hardly justiﬁ ed – even if the relative attractiveness of the regions is taken into account.
Source: Own illustration
Figure 6: Geographical distribution of European diplomatic services in the US
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If one now assumes that not the member states by themselves but the EU would optimise on the 
geographical distribution of the diplomatic missions, it is straightforward to argue that a more 
balanced pattern would emerge. This means that redundant missions in overrepresented areas 
could be closed down whereas missions in underrepresented areas could be opened. This argu-
ment comes closest to Oates’ ‘zoo-effect’ (Oates 1988). Threshold effects based on high ﬁ xed costs 
which have to be defrayed by little potential “consumers” may prevent a single EU member state 
from opening a consulate in the region of Seattle (which is located in the northwest of the US), for 
example. If, by contrast, the EU decides to open a consulate in this area, for instance, the number 
of potential consumers increases while the amount of ﬁ xed costs remains the same. Opening a 
consulate thus becomes more attractive and also increases the beneﬁ ts for all EU citizens. The 
higher costs for the additional missions might then be saved by closing redundancies in overrep-
resented areas. Nevertheless, from a budgetary perspective one would have to expect a certain 
expenditure increasing effect compared to the calculations above.
Conclusions
This analysis backs the hypothesis that Europe could help the member states to save money in 
the ﬁ eld of diplomatic services. The cost structure in the provision of these services by member 
states clearly supports the existence of economies of scale. Larger countries are able to provide 
these services at lower costs than the smaller countries. The differentiated insights have, how-
ever, clariﬁ ed that the extent of savings from an “EU embassy with 27 ﬂ ags” depends on the abil-
ity and willingness of member countries to accept a European spirit within these missions. The 
more functions an international representation takes up that have national elements – and would 
therefore need national experts – the lower are the potential cost savings. In this respect, our 
differentiated calculations are also able to provide a price tag for the luxury of special national 
positions and approaches in European diplomatic services. Distinct national approaches within 
an EU mission may drive costs up by Euro 900 million annually, which is the difference between 
a cautious and optimistic scenario for communitarisation. 
The potential of relative cost savings is not trivial, although absolute amounts are moderate (Euro 
420 million to Euro 1.3 billion annually for ﬁ gures based on large member-state assessments). In 
relative terms, this amounts to a range between six percent and 19 percent of current national 
costs if a realistic scenario is applied. Such an efﬁ ciency gain is signiﬁ cant and most likely far 
beyond the levels that could be reaped by other efﬁ ciency enhancing measures in the public 
sector within a short time span.
However, two caveats should be stressed. First, European civil servants tend to be better paid 
than their national colleagues. The calculations presented here are based on the assumption that 
the wage structure in a European mission would not be different from the average of the existing 
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national missions. This assumption is invalid if for the EU missions EU salaries become relevant. 
Already a wage premium of EU diplomats of ﬁ ve percent compared to their national colleagues 
could neutralize any cost saving effects of European missions and leave the European way even 
the more expensive one. This insight raises delicate questions as to whether the EEAS with its EU 
civil servants would really be the right starting point for reaping economies of scale in this ﬁ eld. 
This issue is, of course, of a more general nature: Whenever an EU provision of public goods 
and services is associated with replacing (cheaper) national staff by (more expensive) EU staff it 
becomes less likely that European tax payers will really beneﬁ t. However, as pointed out before, 
for the case of diplomatic missions, most of the calculated saving potentials refer to administra-
tive tasks and consular services where national staff in line with national wages should stay in 
place in the case of communitarisation.
Second, there might be (dis)incentive descending from the ﬁ nancing system of a common EU 
diplomatic mission. Since the missions are paid from a common EU pool of resources, cost aware-
ness may decrease with new incentives of overprovision. However, in the current situation there 
exist reversed inefﬁ ciencies: Today smaller member states can freeride on the services of the 
diplomatic missions of larger member states which may lead to the underprovision of missions. 
Thus there are countervailing forces with an unpredictable outcome.
In spite of all these caveats, the reﬁ ned and detailed simulations clearly indicate that EU embas-
sies with 27 ﬂ ags have cost savings potential. 
77
Case Study 2: Embassies
References
Alesina, A., I. Angeloni and L. Schuknecht. What Does the European Union Do? Public Choice 123, 
275 – 319, 2005.
Begg, I. Fiscal Federalism, Subsidiarity and the EU Budget Review. Swedish Institute for European 
Policy Studies (SIEPS), Stockholm, 2009.
Council Decision. Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the Organisation and Function-
ing of the European External Action Service (2010/427/Eu). Ofﬁ cial Journal of the European Union 
L 201, 30 – 40, 2010.
ECORYS, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and Institute for Economic Research. 
A Study on EU Spending  – Final Report, Rotterdam.
Emerson, M., R. Balfour, T. Corthaut, J. Wouters, P.M. Kaczynski and T. Renard (2011): Upgrading 
the EU’s Role as Global Actor, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008.
Gräßle, I. Wie attraktiv ist der Dienst in der EU in den Institutionen – Ein Steuer- und Abgaben-
vergleich, http://www.inge-graessle.eu/themen-view/items/339 (01/03/2013).
Gros, D. How to Achieve a Better Budget for the European Union? Centre for European Policy Stud-
ies (CEPS), Brussels, 2008.
Hobolth, M. European Visa Cooperation: Interest Politics and Regional Imagined Communities, 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper No. 34/2011. London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, 2011.
Oates, W.E. On the Measurement of Congestion in the Provision of Local Public Goods. Journal of 
Urban Economics 24 (1), 85 – 94, 1988.
78
Case Study 2: Embassies
Appendix
Division Ranges for communitarisation Saving Potential (%)
Functions of staff (%) cautious confi dent optimistic cautious confi dent optimistic
Consular services 10 0.5 0.7 1 5 7 10
Political relations 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
Economic relations 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Development aid 5 0 0.2 0.4 0 1 2
Military mission 15 0 0.2 0.4 0 3 6
Cultural relations 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
Administration 30 0.4 0.6 0.8 12 18 24
Security services
Press 10 0 0.2 0.4 0 2 4
Overall ranges for communitarisation 17 % 35 % 54 %
Table Appendix 1: Ranges for communitarisation: Hypothetical mission small-size member state
Source: Own illustration
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Case Study 3: Integrated European Land Forces
Matthew Bassford, Sophie-Charlotte Brune, James Gilbert, Friedrich Heinemann, 
Marc-Daniel Moessinger, Stefani Weiss
In mature nation states, defence is a public good that is undisputedly provided by the central 
government. In federal states like the US, Canada, Switzerland, and Germany, this sole central 
responsibility for the armed forces is more than accidental historical heritage. There is a convinc-
ing efﬁ ciency argument that the sub-national provision of defence would be needlessly expensive 
and to the detriment of a high-quality service. In addition, freerider problems would pose numer-
ous disincentives to efﬁ cient security provision.
There is thus a straightforward case for considering the future possibility of defence policy at 
the EU level. This centralisation could offer substantial potential for European added value by 
providing the same security at a lower cost. It could improve the quality and impact of European 
defence while avoiding a larger ﬁ scal burden.
Of course, national sensitivities present a substantial obstacle for a centralised European defence 
solution. For many states, autonomous command over national army, air force, and navy is still 
a symbol of national sovereignty. Under the current regime of imperfect European defence inte-
gration, however, this symbolism has become costly and detrimental to the effectiveness of EU 
member states’ defence activities. Moreover, in times of a common European currency and com-
mon market a national defence seems a bit anachronistic.
With European member states in the grip of ﬁ scal austerity, there is fresh impetus behind 
efforts to improve the efﬁ ciency of defence in Europe. Many of these efforts focus on the pool-
ing and sharing of equipment between member states with the aim of exploiting economies 
The Fiscal Added Value 
of Integrated European 
Land Forces1
1  We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions by Maciej Bukowski, Axel Butenschoen, Vasco Cal, Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Stephan von Cramon-
Taubadel, Tom De Bruijn, Hilmar Linnenkamp, Hans Pitlik, Wilhelm Schönfelder, Michaele Schreyer, Robert Schwager, and Fabian Zuleeg.
 Valuable research assistance by Pierrick Picard, Ben Baruch, Poornima Bhagwat, Laura Renner, and Christian Simon also is gratefully acknowledged.
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of scale and scope.2 By comparison, relatively little analysis has been dedicated to assessing 
the potential beneﬁ ts of reducing inefﬁ ciencies related to both the number and organisation of 
military personnel in Europe. This research addresses this gap, providing high-level analysis 
to estimate the potential added value of reforming the provision of personnel in one, well-
deﬁ ned military sector: European land forces. Speciﬁ cally, we provide a range of estimates for 
the savings potential associated with integrated EU land forces. This enables us to quantify the 
opportunity costs inherent in a continuation of the current national approach.
Over the past decade, there has been signiﬁ cant consolidation in European land forces: total 
troop numbers have fallen from 2.5 million in 2000 to less than one million today. Nevertheless, 
interoperability among the 27 armies of Europe remains low, with differences in doctrine, logis-
tics, command and control, and other crucial lines of development hindering the deployment of 
joint forces. In addition, the capability of a modern army depends not just on its size but also on 
its equipment, and the quality and timeliness of its battleﬁ eld information. Equipment standards 
vary dramatically across the 27 member states, and the mean level of equipment provision falls 
short of the benchmark set by expeditionary forces in Europe – such as France and the UK – and 
other comparators, most notably the US. This suggests that in land forces, Europe’s punch is well 
below its weight. 
The approach in this study is to offer a range of estimates for the savings potential of a more 
integrated approach. We proceed in two steps: 
· First, this study estimates the number of soldiers needed for Europe to achieve the Helsinki 
Headline Goal 2010, which establishes member states’ levels of ambition to fulﬁ l the set of 
military tasks delineated by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration.3 We compare that number to the 
number of soldiers that exist in Europe today. A clear challenge with this approach is that there 
is no single, irrefutable “right size” of land forces in Europe. A greater number of soldiers may 
yield higher levels of military capability, but these beneﬁ ts come with associated costs. This 
analysis aims to quantify the cost of carrying a number of soldiers over and above the level 
required to attain a ﬁ xed (and politically agreed) level of “beneﬁ t” – or military capability. In 
this ﬁ rst step, we also investigate possible economies of scale from a large integrated army 
which may arise from an improved deployability ratio. 
· Second, this study costs the (smaller) number of soldiers required under a more coordinated set 
of European land forces. This takes account of detailed wage information of different national 
2  A number of authors have discussed pooling and sharing in this context.  These include: Brune, S.-C., Cameron, A., Maulny, J.-P., Terlikowski, M., “Re-
structuring Europe’s Armed Forces in Times of Austerity: Challenges and Opportunities for Governments and Industry,” SWP-Comment C/28 (November), 
Berlin, 2010; Maulny, J.-P. and Liberti, F., “Pooling of EU member states Assets in the Implementation of ESDP,” Institut de relations internationales et 
strategiques, 2008; Valasek, T., “Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military collaboration,” Centre for European Reform, 2011; and 
Witney, N., “Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy,” European Council on Foreign Relations policy paper, 2008.
3  Agreed by the Western European Council of Ministers in June 1992 and available at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf
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armies and is based on varying assumptions with respect to the wage structure in a European 
army, as compared to the current coexistence of national armies with their individual wage 
structure. Here, there is publicly available wage data for six of the 27 member states in differ-
ent income classes. This provides a sound anchor for quantifying military-wage levels for the 
remaining countries. Through this reﬁ ned approach, we take account of countervailing forces, 
considering possible cost savings from a smaller number of soldiers, as well as possible cost 
pushes through wage equalisation above the current mean income. 
The goal was to conduct an opportunity analysis to assess the potential for European added value 
through consolidation and harmonisation of land forces personnel. Put simply: Can money be 
saved by reducing army personnel without endangering the EU’s defence capacity? 
The analysis is high level and inevitably rests on a number of assumptions that are highlighted 
throughout the paper. We do not explore details which would be important for turning a high-
level analysis into a detailed plan. The force numbers are counted in aggregate without consider-
ing force mix, military rank or specialist disciplines. The speciﬁ c equipment which soldiers need 
to generate a given capability is not examined. This well-deﬁ ned approach allows us to conduct a 
focussed study of one central factor of production in the provision of defence services: personnel. 
This focus enables quantiﬁ cations of potential cost savings at a level of precision which would not 
be possible in an integrated study of staff and equipment. 
This study is organised into four sections. The ﬁ rst brieﬂ y summarises the status quo of land 
forces in Europe. This is followed by an estimate of the number of soldiers Europe needs to meet 
the Headline Goal 2010. The third section quantiﬁ es the potential added value of more coordinated 
and consolidated European land forces, and the chapter ﬁ nishes with a number of conclusions. 
What is the status quo of European land forces?
In aggregate, Europe has a large number of land forces
The size and structure of land forces vary dramatically across member states. Some countries 
operate with regular forces supplemented by reserves. Others operate relatively small standing 
armies but maintain large paramilitary organisations for homeland defence, often a legacy of the 
Cold War. Applying a broad deﬁ nition of land forces, Europe has more than 1.5 million soldiers 
(see Figure 1).
For this analysis a consistent deﬁ nition of ‘land forces’ is required. The category of ‘regular sol-
dier’ provides the most common deﬁ nition across member states, capturing those army soldiers 
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capable of deploying on EU or other international missions.4 We exclude paramilitary and gen-
darmerie forces from the analysis, but acknowledge that these soldiers – greater than 570,000 
in number – play an important role in homeland defence, policing, coast guarding, and other 
functions. Also excluded are those amphibious forces which are part of European navies. 
The number of regular soldiers in the army of each member state is shown in Figure 2. The total 
is 889,000 soldiers. 
Europe’s land forces need to modernise for the 21st century
The need for the modernisation of Europe’s armies has long been acknowledged.5 Europe boasts a 
large number of regular soldiers. However the quality of equipment, investment in training, and 
deployability varies signiﬁ cantly between states.6 A key determinant of capability is the quality 
of equipment available to land forces. As the character of conﬂ ict changes, soldiers need more 
high-tech equipment such as communications and battleﬁ eld information tools. Modern warfare 
also requires precision attack capabilities and force protection to reduce the number of allied 
casualties and collateral damage to civilian populations. 
4  There are, of course, significant differences between land forces of member states in terms of level of training and expertise.
5  “La défense européenne doit entrer dans une nouvelle ère”, Le Figaro, 6 October 2004. As of 24 October 2012: http://static.euractiv.com/fr/la-defense-
europeenne-doit-entre-news-230522/
6  The UK is notable for investing significantly more for each member of its service personnel than the EU average.
Figure 1: Composition of Europe’s Land Forces
889,089
65,445
573,011
Total: 1,527,545
Source: Analysis of European Defence Agency 2010 data. Military Balance, IISS 2012
 Regular,   Conscript,   Paramilitary / Gendarmerie
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Europe’s shortage of strategic airlift and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and recon-
naissance (ISTAR) assets is also well documented. In the past, Europe’s deﬁ ciencies in key equip-
ment areas have been largely masked by the general readiness of the US to provide assistance to 
European forces, for example by providing reconnaissance aircraft and satellite support during 
the Kosovo conﬂ ict (Shepherd 2000: 27). Even in the recent Libya campaign, hailed by some as 
a success of European leadership (Knowlton 2011), the US was required to provide the bulk of 
air-to-air refuelling and ISTAR support (House of Commons Defence Committee 2012). Without 
this assistance, the operations in Libya would not have been possible. 
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Source: European Defence Agency 2010 data, Military Balance 2012
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The difference in equipment standards between European military personnel and their US coun-
terparts is indicated by equipment spending per member of the armed forces (see Figure 3). 
Europe spends an average of Euro 26,500 per member of its armed forces, compared with more 
than Euro 110,000 in the US (Pires 2012). This is not to suggest that Europe should increase 
total defence spending or aspire to match the spending of the US. But it may be that the current 
ratio of spending on equipment compared to personnel costs is not adequate to properly equip 
Europe’s soldiers for today’s conﬂ icts. Those European national armies that have traditionally 
been less oriented towards expeditionary warfare and with a long conscription history due to the 
predominance of territorial defence challenges are, in general, particularly poorly equipped and 
require signiﬁ cant investment.
The US is reducing its military commitments in Europe
Looking ahead, it is likely that Europe will act autonomously on security missions in its own 
neighbourhood, particularly as the US draws down its military presence in Europe. In the past, 
a reliance on US military support was, to some extent, built into NATO planning assumptions 
and there was both tacit and explicit recognition that the US would play a leading role in NATO 
operations.
Figure 3: Equipment spending per armed forces personnel
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However, since 2006 the US has been shrinking its European footprint, closing approximately 
100 bases. In February 2012, the US Department of Defence announced a further 25 percent 
reduction in the number of troops stationed in Europe. This “pivot” towards the Asia Paciﬁ c 
region marks a turning point in US activity in Europe, and makes it more likely that European 
nations will be required to act without US support, implying a requirement for more capable and 
deployable European forces (Clinton 2011). 
In summary, Europe’s aggregate land forces, while large in number, fall far behind forces of 
comparable size when judged on military capability. This matters now, more than at any time in 
recent history, as the likelihood increases of Europe being required to act militarily with only 
minimal support from the US. 
How many soldiers does Europe need?
The implication of the assessment presented in Chapter 2 is that taken in aggregate, European 
land forces are ill-suited to today’s strategic security context. The military ambition for expe-
ditionary operations requires well-trained, well-equipped and deployable joint forces that are 
integrated and interoperable. This is true for land, maritime and air forces. However, European 
national armies have not seen the level of integration that is present in the structures of allied 
air forces and navies.7 This section attempts to quantify the number of soldiers that a more inte-
grated and interoperable set of national land forces would comprise to meet the military ambition 
of Europe’s states.
The exercise of estimating the ‘optimal’ size of an army is fraught with difﬁ culty. Such an esti-
mate depends on the level of military ambition of governments and the capabilities of potential 
adversaries, as well as the level of provision and quality of other enabling functions such as 
intelligence, logistics and literal manoeuvre capability, etc. The number of soldiers also depends 
on the level of certainty of success required by governments. 
Rather than trying to estimate the ‘optimum’ number of soldiers, we ask two separate questions 
to arrive at an estimate of demand for soldiers in Europe:
1. How many soldiers does Europe need to meet the Headline Goal 2010?
2. How many soldiers has Europe needed to meet its military obligations 
 over the last ﬁ fteen years?
7  Which have developed integrated air defence, common logistical assets and procedures, multinational Standing Naval Forces, to provide a few examples.
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Europe’s demand for land forces is articulated 
in the Helsinki Headline Goals
Europe’s demand for land forces was outlined as part of the Requirements Catalogue 2005, 
which deﬁ ned the level of military resources to meet the Headline Goal 2010. The Requirements 
Catalogue is not available to the public. Therefore this study estimates the number of land forces 
required to meet the Headline Goals based on interviews with European military experts. The 
estimates mirror the scenario-based framework used in the Requirements Catalogue.
 According to the Headline Goals, the EU’s level of ambition is either:
· To launch a major operation with up to 60,000 troops within 60 days and be able to sustain it 
for at least one year.
 Or to launch and concurrently uphold:8
· Two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations supported by up to 10,000 troops for at 
least two years;
· Two rapid response operations of limited duration using two EU battlegroups of approximately 
5,000 soldiers per battlegroup;
· One emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals. (Here the major tasks 
would be conducted by Air and Naval forces, with minimal involvement of land forces up to one 
battlegroup); 
· One civil-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days and involving also 
a minimum of land forces.
8  The decision to establish this equivalence was adopted by the European Council of 12 December 2008 under the French Presidency on the basis of a Council 
declaration on the reinforcement of capabilities for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). See: Council of the European Union, Declaration on 
Strengthening Capabilities, 16840/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008. As of 25 October 2012: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/
pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf
Figure 4: Number of land force troops required under EU Headline Goals
Source: Own illustration
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 Finally, the EU’s ambition also includes the following tasks:
· A maritime or air interdiction operation;
· Around 12 ESDP civilian missions of varying formats together with a major mission involving 
up to 3,000 experts and lasting for several years.
These ﬁ nal two mission types were not included in the calculations as they do not require sig-
niﬁ cant contributions from land forces. The Headline Goals and the respective estimates of land 
forces personnel required for each mission are summarised in Figure 4. 
The estimates show that the maximum number of combat soldiers required in theatre in a 
given year is 60,000 for a major operation, compared to 38,500 for a series of concurrent minor 
operations.
The number of combat soldiers must be sufficient 
to sustain operations over time
The force numbers presented above reﬂ ect the number of troops needed in theatre to conduct the 
hypothetical missions. Some operations need to be sustained for a prolonged period, meaning 
Figure 5: EU land forces deployment cycle
Source: Own illustration
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that the estimate of the required number of soldiers must be increased to allow for tour lengths 
and include those soldiers who will be both preparing for and recovering from deployment.9 
Tour lengths and the interval between deployments vary from one European army to another. For 
the purpose of calculating the size of a sustainable force, this analysis assumes an EU average 
four-phased cycle in which a tour of duty lasts for six months, with 18 months between deploy-
ments (see Figure 5). This implies that the estimate of combat soldiers must be multiplied by four.
Interviews with EU military staff, along with examples from the British Army, suggest that the 
interval between deployments can be as great as 24 months. In this case, the multiple of in-
theatre soldiers would be ﬁ ve. Table 1 summarises the estimates of the total number of combat 
troops required to prosecute different operations. The number of European troops needed to pros-
ecute a major operation over a sustained period is estimated between 240,000 and 300,000.10 The 
number of troops required to conduct the range of concurrent small-scale missions is between 
98,500 and 118,500. To ensure that the number of soldiers required is not underestimated, the 
higher number is used in later calculations.
9  Note that the ability to sustain the deployment of troops continuously in mid- to long-term operations (i.e. sustainability) is different from the ability to 
rapidly deploy troops (i.e. deployability). Deployability is calculated by the EDA and NATO as the average of total armed forces deployed throughout a year 
for crisis management operations compared to forces troops structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations (NATO postulates a 50% usability 
target). Sustainable forces are a subset of deployable forces.
10 This number was validated through interviews with experts, who estimated that two divisions of land forces, each composed of three brigades (46 bat-
talions of 700 soldiers), are necessary to sustainably implement the stated EU level of ambition. In total, the alternative estimate provided by experts 
amounted to approximately 250,000 soldiers.
Type of Operation
Base Number of 
Soldiers for Mission
Required number of Land forces to 
meet EU Sustainability requirements
Base number x4 Base number x5
One major operation (1 year) 60,000 240,000 300,000
or
Two major stabilisation and 
reconstruction operations (2 years)
20,000 80,000 100,000
Two rapid response operations 
of limited duration 
10,000 (maximum) 10,000 10,000
One evacuation operation 2,500 2,500 2,500
One civil-military humanitarian 
assistance operation (up to 90 days)
6,000 6,000 6,000
Total for alternative missions 98,500 118,500
Table 1: Estimate of sustainable force numbers
Source: Own illustration
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Additional soldiers are required to provide support to combat forces
The estimates so far focus only on the number of combat troops deployed or preparing to deploy to 
the front line.11 Additional personnel are required to complete other essential non-combat tasks 
including:
· Maintenance
· Procurement
· Facilities management
· Accounting and other back-ofﬁ ce functions
Figure 6 shows the number of deployable soldiers compared to the total size of land forces for 
each member state (detailed ﬁ gures per country are given in the appendix, see Table A1). The 
ﬁ tted line shows the number of deployable soldiers increasing disproportionately to the total size 
of land forces, which suggests economies of scale in land forces. This implies that larger armies 
are able to use resources more efﬁ ciently compared to smaller armies, in areas such as staff 
workload and personnel administration as well as in training capacities. 
11  Including armour, infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, engineers and signals.
Figure 6: Number of deployable land forces to total number of land forces
Source: EDA 2010
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With most of the armies clustered around the bottom left corner of the chart, we also plot the 
proportion of soldiers that can be deployed on operations against the total number of regular 
soldiers (Figure 7).12 In aggregate, the mean deployability ratio across the EU member states is 
50 percent, when weighted according to the number of soldiers in each national army (European 
Defence Agency 2010).13
The ﬁ gure reveals the large variation in deployability across member states: the largest three 
land forces in Europe report deployability ratios over 50 percent, but a number of member states 
have deployability ratios between two and 30 percent. As a caveat, one should bear in mind 
that smaller armies are often not aligned to ﬁ ght at the front line, which might imply lower 
deployability shares that impact the ratios. On the other hand, an integrated European army is 
even more able to operate international military interventions and should thus be able to reach a 
higher deployability level. More coordination and harmonisation of European forces could help to 
improve the deployability of land forces. Combined with the aforementioned arguments concern-
ing the presence of economies of scale, the results thus suggest that a European army should 
achieve a deployability level of at least 50 percent. 
12 Note that, as opposed to usually reported deployability shares which are calculated in relation to the number of total forces, we have plotted deployability 
shares in relation to regular land forces. This is because the investigation here is solely focused on land force soldiers but does not include further soldier 
categories. Additionally, the share’s numerator is based on land force soldiers only.
13 Due to missing data, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, and Latvia could not be included.
Figure 7: Deployability ratios of EU 27 land forces
Source: EDA 2010
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As a rough calibration to provide an additional triangulation point for this argument, this study 
compares deployability data with an alternative estimate of “tooth-to-tail” ratios for the armed 
forces of selected European member states (Figure 8). In this sense, the “tooth” corresponds 
to combat and combat-support forces and the “tail” to general non-combat roles (like logistics, 
medical and communications) (Gebicke, Scott, and Magid 2010: 14 – 21). The range of alterna-
tive estimates was 24 percent (France) to 60 percent (Netherlands), with a simple mean of 36 
percent. This alternative estimate only provides a very approximate calibration, since it reﬂ ects 
personnel numbers for all of the armed forces (rather than focusing exclusively on land forces). 
Nevertheless, it suggests that when back-ofﬁ ce functions are fully taken into account, the real 
“tooth-to-tail” ratio may be less than the 50 percent reported by member states. In other words, a 
functioning army may contain more non-combat personnel than combat personnel.
Figure 8: Tooth-to-tail ratios
Source: McKinsey and Co. 2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ne
th
er
lan
ds
Ge
rm
an
y
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Gr
ee
ce
Po
lan
d
Be
lgi
um
Sw
ed
en Ita
ly
De
nm
ar
k
Sp
ain
Fra
nc
e
Po
rtu
ga
l
Proportion of combat forces 
relative to total forces
93
Case Study 3: Integrated European Land Forces
The total required size of European land forces 
is between 480,000 and 750,000
Taking the combat force requirements for individual missions as ﬁ xed, this study adjusts the 
two variables (deployability multiple and tooth-to-tail ratio) to establish a range of total force 
size needed to prosecute the missions under the Petersberg tasks. Based on these variables, the 
low-point of the range is 480,000, and the high is 750,000 (Table 2).
The analysis suggests three levels of demand to be used 
in the calculations of European added value: 
· Low – 480,000
· Medium – 600,000
· High – 750,000
The requirement for territorial defence is also delivered 
through these combat forces
Historically, the rationale for sustaining large, non-deployable European land forces has been 
underpinned by a requirement for territorial defence against a large-scale land invasion from 
a global superpower adversary (i.e. the Soviet Union during the Cold War period). This was 
achieved largely through national conscription. However, in the context of the current security 
environment this requirement is no longer tenable and almost any conceivable conventional 
(i.e. non-nuclear) threat against European states in the foreseeable future would require mod-
ern, professional, well-equipped forces. 
In other words, the nature of territorial defence is now much like expeditionary combat war. In 
the event of a major crisis – a threat to the very survival of European states – our assumption is 
Sustainability multiple
x4 x5
Deployability
50:50 480,000 600,000
40:60 600,000 750,000
Table 2: Range of estimates of demand for land forces under different assumptions
Source: Own illustration
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Source: IISS, Military Balance 1997–2012
Figure 9: Deployment of EU Member State land forces 1997–2012
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that civilians would be mobilised to help defend their homeland.14 In addition, the overarching 
collective security guarantee provided by NATO means that the majority of European states 
have their territorial defence effectively ‘underwritten’ by the US.
The size of recent European military deployments 
support our estimates
To validate and provide context for the estimates of required size of land forces, we reviewed 
military engagements over the last 15 years (since 1997) to establish the number of soldiers 
actually deployed on missions by EU member states over that time period. As would be expected, 
different member states contribute different numbers of soldiers to international missions. In 
aggregate the range of soldiers deployed by EU member states was between 25,000 and 60,000 
(Figure 9). 
This analysis shows that the years of highest deployment saw sustained deployment of 60,000 
soldiers. This closely matches this study’s estimate of the maximum number of combat soldiers 
required in-theatre to meet a high-intensity operation under the Headline Goal. These peak 
deployments correspond to military surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Analysis of mission types over the last 15 years shows European forces engaged in a variety 
of missions, mandates, and regions of operation. Member states have contributed soldiers to a 
number of global and EU stabilisation missions (e.g. Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, 
the Balkans). Some have also contributed to missions led by a single or small group of nations 
(e.g. Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon). Overall, the 15-year historic deployment data provides some 
empirical, top-down assurance of our bottom-up, mission-based estimates. 
What is the potential European added value?
The ﬁ rst part of this analysis established that the supply of regular soldiers in Europe today is 
approximately 900,000. Based on mission scenarios articulated under the Petersberg Tasks, we 
then estimated that the required size of European land forces is between 480,000 and 750,000. 
The surplus of land forces personnel in Europe is therefore estimated to be between 150,000 
and 420,000. To quantify the potential monetary value of that surplus, or the potential savings 
to Europe, this research identiﬁ ed average wages for land forces in different member states in 
order to cost the status quo and potential, future force sizes.
14 This assumption was validated through interviews with military experts.
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We were required to estimate average wages for European land forces
Wage data was gathered for soldiers in six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
and the United Kingdom. The data for France, Germany, and the UK show wage level by army 
rank (e.g. brigadier, colonel, major) whereas data for Belgium, Italy and Poland are aggregated by 
category of soldier (e.g. general ofﬁ cers, non-commissioned ofﬁ cers and privates). With this data, 
we calculated a weighted average wage of land forces for each of the six countries, based on the 
number of soldiers at each rank and their corresponding wage levels (detailed ﬁ gures are given 
in Tables A2 – A5 in the Appendix). 
These six average wage levels are used to estimate the wages of land forces in the remaining 
countries. Based on Eurostat data on annual gross earnings,15 each member state is assigned to 
one of the six countries based on the nearest comparable gross earnings.16 Figure 10 shows the 
example of Spain, whose nearest comparator country is Italy (for more information see Table A5 
in the Appendix). 
Finally, the average wage for each member state is derived by taking the land forces’ wage of the 
comparator country and adjusting it according to the relative difference in annual gross earn-
ings. This approach assumes a similar relationship between military wage levels and general 
15 Annual gross earnings of a single parent without children, 100% of AW in Euro.
16 We calculate the distance in annual gross earnings of all EU member states to all six member states for which we have average wages of land forces and 
assign countries according to their minimal distance to one of our reference countries.
Figure 10: Assigning member states to comparator countries
Source: Own illustration
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wage levels between two countries. For example Spain, whose annual gross earnings are 87.8 
percent of those of its comparator (Italy), has an estimated land forces wage of Euro 13,670 (Fig-
ure 11). The same approach is applied to all countries in the different matching groups (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland, UK, see Table A5).17 
There appears to be significant potential for European 
added value in land forces
Having derived the average wages for land force soldiers in each EU member state, we calculate 
the potential costs of two hypothetical future organisational structures:
1.  27 EU member state armies, with greater coordination and interoperability
 In this case it is assumed that each member state would contribute a proportion of soldiers 
equal to the status quo in Europe. For example, German soldiers account for 10.5 percent of 
all soldiers in Europe today. This study assumes that Germany would continue to provide 10.5 
percent of a smaller aggregate number of European soldiers.
2. Integrated European Petersberg Army
 In this situation it is assumed that all soldiers in a single army would be paid the same wage, 
equal to the current highest land forces’ wage rate in Europe.
17 It is important to stress that the Eurostat data on gross income are only used to assign countries to a suitable counterpart and to adjust the land force 
average wages according to the relative proportion of gross income. We are, however, not interested in the actual size of the figures and do not use these 
figures for any quantification of land force wages.
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Figure 11: Estimation of land force wages
Source: Own illustration
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The second assumption accounts for a possible cost driver which could counteract the advan-
tage from a lower number of soldiers: A tendency to pay EU soldiers’ wages above the average 
of today’s national armies could (over)compensate the cost advantages from a more integrated 
army. This reﬁ nement is crucial for a non-naïve approach to the potential added value of Euro-
pean service provision in general and has also been applied for other potential European services 
(see case study on European international representations).
We consider these structures against the low, medium and high estimates of the size of European 
land forces and apply two different wage scenarios. In a rather optimistic wage-scenario, we 
assume the payments are decentralised, i.e. the soldiers are paid according to their countries 
of origin. In a rather cautious (more realistic) wage-scenario, we instead assume that in a cen-
tralised army the soldier’s remuneration is also centralised, i.e. land force soldiers are paid a 
common European wage. In the ﬁ rst round of calculations, we have decided to use the highest 
average wage for land force soldiers (the UK average wage). In the following rounds, however, we 
will also present thresholds of centralised wages.
The results are presented in Table 3. If Europe had a smaller aggregate number of soldiers with 
greater coordination and interoperability between the armies of the 27 member states, the poten-
tial European added value is estimated at between Euro 3.1 billion and Euro 9.2 billion. In the 
case of a single European Petersberg Army, in which wages for all soldiers align with the upper 
bound of current national wage schemes (Euro 40,000), the estimate of European added value 
is approximately Euro 1 billion in the ‘low’ scenario, and negative in the ‘medium’ and ‘high’ 
scenarios (for more information see Table A6 in the Appendix).
The latter results, however, are driven by the very extreme assumption of a centralised European 
remuneration which aligns with the highest national wages in the current payment scheme. 
Size of future European land forces Assumed wage levels European added value (Euro)
Low
(480,000)
National 9,233,850,000
European 868,285,000
Medium
(600,000)
National 6,525,240,000
European – 3,931,715,000
High
(750,000)
National 3,139,480,000
European – 9,931,715,000
Table 3: Estimate of European added value
Source: ZEW and RAND Europe analysis
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This study therefore also presents threshold wages for each scenario and compares these threshold 
wages with median wages of the status quo. In case of the medium counterfactual scenario, the 
threshold wage for land force soldiers to derive positive European added value is Euro 33,500. This 
threshold wage further decreases with the size of the counterfactual: Euro 25,730 in the high coun-
terfactual scenario. However, even these ﬁ gures exceed the estimated status quo wage level of land 
forces in Europe, which range from Euro 18,480 (median wage) to Euro 22,570 (weighted average). 
Taken together, the results point towards the presence of European added value unless central-
ised remuneration reaches a critical threshold, in which case the beneﬁ ts of centralisation shrink 
to potentially negative levels. This means that to fully beneﬁ t from centralisation, centralised 
European wages for land force soldiers should not exceed 83 percent of the current maximum 
national wage for land force soldiers. 
Conclusions
The analysis shows that there is potential for 
signiﬁ cant added value from smaller, more 
coordinated European land forces. In monetary 
terms, the opportunity for savings is estimated 
at between Euro 3 and Euro 9 billion per annum 
(Figure 12). Under the ‘medium’ scenario used 
in the analysis, Europe’s 27 would in the future 
have a total of 600,000 land forces soldiers, 
compared with 890,000 soldiers today. This 
would be a signiﬁ cant but realistic reduction in 
personnel numbers – approximately one-third. 
The British Army’s re-sizing of regular man-
ning levels, from 110,000 in 2011 to 82,000 by 
2020, amounts to a reduction in size of almost 
30 percent (British Army 2012).
The beneﬁ t to European member states of con-
solidating their land forces to 600,000 would 
be approximately Euro 6.5 billion a year. How-
ever, the crucial caveat emerging from our 
wage-dependent simulations is that there is no 
convergence of wages to the top. If this were 
the case, the cost advantage of European land 
forces would translate into a cost disadvantage.
Figure 12: European added value for 
different sizes of land forces
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Assuming a continuation of today’s wage structure, this is a conservative estimate of the sav-
ings potential since this study has not attempted to quantify likely cost savings in other lines of 
development which would follow from a smaller manning total. It could be reasonably expected that 
expenditure related to basing, training and routine consumables would decline in line with per-
sonnel numbers. There would be additional savings in personnel costs from reduced pension and 
beneﬁ t payments which are not included in these calculations. Finally, this study only considered a 
consolidation of regular soldiers and does not assume any reduction in the number of gendarmerie 
and conscription soldiers, which together total a further 570,000. 
Simply cutting manning levels without improving European interoperability would reduce 
Europe’s aggregate military capability. The only way for Europe to be able to conduct high-inten-
sity operations over a sustained period is by working together. To capture the potential European 
added value, any reduction in total personnel numbers should be accompanied by greater coop-
eration and coordination between member states’ land forces. This could be achieved through 
European agreements on common standards, more integrated training, and specialisation across 
European forces. 
European regular land forces of 600,000 would be similar in size to the US Army (570,000). With 
Europe’s aggregate spending on military equipment per soldier so far below that of other advanced 
armies, savings from a reduction in manpower could be used to invest in the equipment required to 
modernise Europe’s armed forces. This could include investment in helicopters, munitions, modern 
communications, and electronic countermeasures to provide soldiers with the most up-to-date and 
effective equipment. Based on our estimates, this investment could be up to Euro 10,800 per soldier 
in Europe, an increase of almost 40 percent compared with current spending. 
The primary purpose of this study was to estimate a range of potential ﬁ nancial savings that 
could be realised should European land forces be conﬁ gured to meet the stated military ambition 
of European member states. Our analysis was necessarily top down and contains a number of 
broad assumptions.
The potential savings estimated are substantial and – we believe – achievable. There would be 
practical and political challenges in effecting both the reductions and the required coordination 
between national defence ministries. But Europe’s defence forces are facing new security chal-
lenges while lacking the ﬁ nancial headroom to make necessary investments. At Euro 6.5 billion 
a year the potential added value of greater European cooperation should be compelling.
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Appendix
Regular
land force soldiers
Deployable
land forces
Deployable land forces 
to regular land forces
Country Number Number Share
Austria 28,053 2,050 7.31
Belgium 21,586 7,344 34.02
Bulgaria 14,747 6,103 41.38
Cyprus 10,954 237 2.16
Czech Republic 18,128 8,441 46.56
Denmark* 8,155
Estonia 1,393 697 50.04
Finland 27,119 1,800 6.64
France 112,000 88,000 78.57
Germany* 93,358
Greece 86,300 22,182 25.70
Hungary 10,438 3,300 31.62
Ireland 6,401 850 13.28
Italy 107,020 61,000 57.00
Latvia* 1,772
Lithuania 2,982 1,270 42.59
Luxembourg 464 241 51.94
Malta 1,578 159 10.08
Netherlands 20,503 18,475 90.11
Poland 46,560 3,130 6.72
Portugal 20,236 8,963 44.29
Romania 38,711 10,633 27.47
Slovakia 5,391 2,827 52.44
Slovenia 6,621 2,221 33.54
Spain 82,853 51,027 61.59
Sweden 4,476 3,122 69.75
UK 111,290 76,400 68.65
Sum 889,089
Table Appendix 1: Deployability shares
Source: Defence Data: Maria Leonor Pires: EDA participating member states in 2010, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/National_Defence_Data_2010_4.pdf
* Information on deployable land forces is not available
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Annual wages Army personnel Weight Average wage
in £ (2011/12) number of soldiers Soldiers Category Soldiers Category
General Offi cers  2,588  2.44  2,220 £
General 177,993 £ 58 0.05 97 £
Brigadier 100,964 £ 170 0.16 162 £
Colonel 81,310 £ 580 0.55 444 £
Lieutenant Colonel 77,617 £ 1,780 1.68 1,300 £
Offi cers  12,180  11.46  4,076 £
Major 57,199 £ 4,700 4.42 2,531 £
Captain 39,959 £ 5,040 4.74 1,896 £
Lieutenant 31,147 £ 2,440 1.15 358 £
2nd Lieutenant 24,615 £ 1.15 283 £
Non-commissioned  Offi cers  22,160  20.86  8,501 £
Warrant Offi cer I 46,753 £ 1,620 1.52 713 £
Warrant Offi cer II 43,252 £ 4,500 4.24 1,832 £
Staff Sergeant 38,256 £ 5,950 5.60 2,143 £
Sergeant 36,929 £ 10,090 9.50 3,507 £
Privates  69,310  65.24  18,881 £
Corporal 33,182 £ 15,340 14.44 4,791 £
Lance Corporal 28,940 £ 16,200 15.25 4,413 £
Private 17,736 £ 37,770 35.55 6,306 £
Total number of soldiers  106,238     
Average wage UK (£)     30,774 £ 33,678 £
Average wage UK (€) 38,816 € 42,478 €
Table Appendix 2: Calculation of average wage: UK
Source: Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011
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Annual wages Army personnel Weight Average wage
in € (2011/12) number of soldiers Soldiers Category Soldiers Category
General Offi cers  210  0.10  107.49 €
General 127,368 € 3 0.00 1.91 €
Generalleutnant 108,204 € 29 0.01 15.65 €
Generalmajor 97,056 € 48 0.02 23.24 €
Brigadegeneral 92,280 € 130 0.06 59.83 €
Offi cers  38,162  19.03  7,867.14 €
Oberst 70,388 € 1,230 0.61 431.81 €
Oberstleutnant 52,501 € 9,240 4.61 2,419.54 €
Stabshauptmann, Major 44,483 € 3,581 1.79 794.49 €
Hauptmann 38,182 € 10,470 5.22 1,993.89 €
Oberleutnant 32,173 € 8,058 4.02 1,293.05 €
Leutnant 29,099 € 5,583 2.78 810.28 €
Non-Commissioned Offi cers  119,164  59.43  15,660.78 €
Stabsfeldwebel, Oberstabsfeldwebel 29,099 € 13,420 6.69 1,947.70 €
Hauptfeldwebel Oberfähnrich 27,367 € 22,299 11.12 3,043.76 €
Stabsunteroffi zier, Feldwebel, 
Fähnrich, Oberfeldwebel
25,332 € 73,058 36.44 9,230.63 €
Stabsunteroffi zier 23,728 € 10,387 5.18 1,229.27 €
Privates  42,960  21.43  4,781.01 €
(Ober-)Stabsgefreiter, Unteroffi zier 22,893 € 12,165 6.07 1,389.02 €
Obergefreiter, Hauptgefreiter 22,313 € 25,701 12.82 2,860.26 €
Schütze, Gefreiter 21,614 € 5,094 2.54 549.14 €
Total number of soldiers  200,496   
Average wage Germany (€)     28,093.47 € 28,416.42 €
Table Appendix 3: Calculation of average wage: Germany
Source: http://www.deutsches-wehrrecht.de
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Annual wages Army personnel Weight Average wage
in € (2011) number of soldiers Soldiers Category Soldiers Category
Offi cers   13.20  8,395 €
General General Offi cers 83,820 €
Group III Colonel 73,752 €
Group II Commandant, 
Lieutenant-colonel
53,442 €
Group I Lieutenant, Captaine 38,556 €
Non-Commissioned Offi cers   35.00  10,156 €
Group III Major 33,096 €
Group II Adjudant, 
Adjundants-chefs
29,016 €
Group I Sergent, Sergent-chef 20,232 €
Privates  51.80 8,684 €
Caporal-chef 18,768 €
Caporal 16,764 €
Soldat 16,620 €
Total number of soldiers      
Average wage France (€)    27,234 €
Table Appendix 4: Calculation of average wage: France
Source: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/sga
Notes: The calculation of military average wages for land forces in the remaining countries Belgium, Italy, Poland follows the same procedure. There is, however, 
no detailed information on the number of soldiers per category. As for France, for these countries we have used average shares per category of Germany and 
the UK instead.
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Gross salary 
(2010, €)
Difference 
to
Matching 
country*
Wage 
relation** 
Average 
wage*** 
Poland Germany Italy Belgium UK France (%) (per soldier)
Austria 38,504 € 29,462 € 3,896 € 10,280 € 2,995 € 1,477 € 3,654 € UK 96.31 % 40,908 €
Belgium 41,499 € 32,456 € 901 € 13,275 € 0 € 1,518 € 6,649 € Belgium 18,476 €
Bulgaria 3,883 € 5,159 € 38,517 € 24,341 € 37,615 € 36,097 € 30,966 € Poland 42.95 % 4,298 €
Cyprus 25,699 € 16,657 € 16,701 € 2,525 € 15,799 € 14,281 € 9,150 € Italy 91.06 % 14,173 €
Czech Rep. 11,364 € 2,321 € 31,036 € 16,860 € 30,135 € 28,617 € 23,486 € Poland 125.67 % 12,578 €
Denmark 50,498 € 41,456 € 8,098 € 22,274 € 8,999 € 10,517 € 15,649 € Germany 119.10 % 33,844 €
Estonia 9,580 € 538 € 32,820 € 18,644 € 31,918 € 30,400 € 25,269 € Poland 105.95 % 10,604 €
Finland 39,982 € 30,940 € 2,418 € 11,758 € 1,516 € 2 € 5,133 € UK 100.00 % 42,479 €
France 34,849 € 25,807 € 7,551 € 6,625 € 6,649 € 5,131 € 0 € France 27,234 €
Germany 42,400 € 33,358 € 0 € 14,176 € 901 € 2,419 € 7,551 € Germany 28,416 €
Greece 20,457 € 11,415 € 21,943 € 7,767 € 21,042 € 19,524 € 14,392 € Italy 72.48 % 11,282 €
Hungary 9,118 € 76 € 33,282 € 19,106 € 32,380 € 30,863 € 25,731 € Poland 100.84 % 10,092 €
Ireland 32,308 € 23,266 € 10,092 € 4,084 € 9,191 € 7,673 € 2,541 € France 92.71 % 25,248 €
Italy 28,224 € 19,182 € 14,176 € 0 € 13,275 € 11,757 € 6,625 € Italy 15,566 €
Latvia 8,213 € 829 € 34,187 € 20,011 € 33,286 € 31,768 € 26,637 € Poland 90.83 % 9,090 €
Lithuania 6,767 € 2,275 € 35,633 € 21,457 € 34,732 € 33,214 € 28,082 € Poland 74.84 % 7,490 €
Luxembourg 49,317 € 40,275 € 6,917 € 21,093 € 7,818 € 9,336 € 14,468 € Germany 116.31 % 33,052 €
Malta 17,947 € 8,905 € 24,453 € 10,277 € 23,552 € 22,034 € 16,902 € Poland 198.48 % 19,865 €
Netherlands 45,215 € 36,173 € 2,815 € 16,991 € 3,716 € 5,234 € 10,366 € Germany 106.64 % 30,303 €
Poland 9,042 € 0 € 33,358 € 19,182 € 32,456 € 30,938 € 25,807 € Poland 10,008 €
Portugal 17,352 € 8,310 € 25,048 € 10,872 € 24,147 € 22,629 € 17,497 € Poland 191.90 % 19,206 €
Romania 5,572 € 3,470 € 36,828 € 22,652 € 35,926 € 34,408 € 29,277 € Poland 61.63 % 6,168 €
Slovakia 9,325 € 283 € 33,075 € 18,899 € 32,174 € 30,656 € 25,525 € Poland 103.12 % 10,321 €
Slovenia 16,915 € 7,872 € 25,485 € 11,309 € 24,584 € 23,066 € 17,935 € Poland 187.06 % 18,722 €
Spain 24,786 € 15,744 € 17,614 € 3,438 € 16,713 € 15,195 € 10,064 € Italy 87.82 % 13,669 €
Sweden 38,607 € 29,565 € 3,793 € 10,383 € 2,891 € 1,374 € 3,758 € UK 96.56 % 41,018 €
UK 39,981 € 30,938 € 2,419 € 11,757 € 1,518 € 0 € 5,131 € UK 42,478 €
Table Appendix 5: Calculation of military average wage for land forces based on minimal distances
Source: Eurostat
* According to minimum difference.  ** Wage relation of gross salary according to matching country.
*** Average wage of matching country multiplied with wage relation.
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Land force soldiers Average wage Land force expenditures
National Centralized Status quo National wages Centralized wages
(1) 
Number
(2) 
Share
(3) Number 
per country
(4)
Euro
(5)
Euro
= (1) × (4)
Euro
= (3) × (4)
Euro
= (3) × (5)
Euro
Austria 28,053 0.03 18,932 40,908 € 40,000 € 1,147,603,632 € 774,458,102 € 757,260,522 €
Belgium 21,586 0.02 14,567 18,476 € 40,000 € 398,829,170 € 269,149,098 € 582,690,822 €
Bulgaria 14,747 0.02 9,952 4,298 € 40,000 € 63,386,121 € 42,776,002 € 398,079,382 €
Cyprus 10,954 0.01 7,392 14,173 € 40,000 € 155,253,188 € 104,772,315 € 295,691,432 €
Czech Rep. 18,128 0.02 12,234 12,578 € 40,000 € 228,011,815 € 153,873,334 € 489,345,836 €
Denmark 8,155 0.01 5,503 33,844 € 40,000 € 275,995,324 € 186,254,913 € 220,135,442 €
Estonia 1,393 0.00 940 10,604 € 40,000 € 14,771,352 € 9,968,419 € 37,602,535 €
Finland 27,119 0.03 18,301 42,479 € 40,000 € 1,151,994,085 € 777,420,991 € 732,048,198 €
France 112,000 0.13 75,583 27,234 € 40,000 € 3,050,225,472 € 2,058,438,788 € 3,023,319,375 €
Germany 93,358 0.11 63,002 28,416 € 40,000 € 2,652,900,591 € 1,790,304,857 € 2,520,098,663 €
Greece 86,300 0.10 58,239 11,282 € 40,000 € 973,637,412 € 657,057,333 € 2,329,575,554 €
Hungary 10,438 0.01 7,044 10,092 € 40,000 € 105,343,680 € 71,090,979 € 281,762,568 €
Ireland 6,401 0.01 4,320 25,248 € 40,000 € 161,613,084 € 109,064,278 € 172,788,101 €
Italy 107,020 0.12 72,222 15,566 € 40,000 € 1,665,819,810 € 1,124,175,292 € 2,888,889,639 €
Latvia 1,772 0.00 1,196 9,090 € 40,000 € 16,108,221 € 10,870,602 € 47,833,232 €
Lithuania 2,982 0.00 2,012 7,490 € 40,000 € 22,335,167 € 15,072,845 € 80,495,878 €
Luxembourg 464 0.00 313 33,052 € 40,000 € 15,336,216 € 10,349,616 € 12,525,180 €
Malta 1,578 0.00 1,065 19,865 € 40,000 € 31,346,292 € 21,153,985 € 42,596,410 €
Netherlands 20,503 0.02 13,836 30,303 € 40,000 € 621,303,110 € 419,285,208 € 553,456,403 €
Poland 46,560 0.05 31,421 10,008 € 40,000 € 465,989,186 € 314,471,905 € 1,256,837,055 €
Portugal 20,236 0.02 13,656 19,206 € 40,000 € 388,651,435 € 262,280,672 € 546,249,026 €
Romania 38,711 0.04 26,124 6,168 € 40,000 € 238,760,474 € 161,127,046 € 1,044,961,753 €
Slovakia 5,391 0.01 3,638 10,321 € 40,000 € 55,641,041 € 37,549,249 € 145,524,239 €
Slovenia 6,621 0.01 4,468 18,722 € 40,000 € 123,958,330 € 83,653,041 € 178,726,764 €
Spain 82,853 0.09 55,913 13,669 € 40,000 € 1,132,549,241 € 764,298,675 € 2,236,527,502 €
Sweden 4,476 0.01 3,021 41,018 € 40,000 € 183,597,671 € 123,900,535 € 120,824,799 €
UK 111,290 0.13 75,104 42,478 € 40,000 € 4,727,323,694 € 3,190,225,294 € 3,004,153,690 €
Sum 889,089 1.00 600,000 20,068,284,814 € 13,543,043,372 € 24,000,000,000 €
Table Appendix 6: Calculation of European added value for land force soldiers (Example: European land forces = 600,000 soldiers)
Source: Own illustration
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Measuring European
Added Value: The 
Problem of Preference 
Heterogeneity
Hans Pitlik
Despite the substantial progress in economic and political integration over the past 60 years, 
the EU still has only limited ﬁ scal responsibilities. The Union’s overall budget amounts to about 
one percent of member states’ GDP, which is just a small fraction of average national budgets 
with government expenditure-to-GDP ratios often far higher than 50 percent. An explanation is 
that the policy competencies currently allocated to the European level are largely of a regulatory 
character and thus do not carry signiﬁ cant expenditure needs. Only in the ﬁ elds of regional 
(structural) and agricultural policies are ﬁ nancial resources of notable size (at least from a mac-
roeconomic perspective) spent by the EU.
Although of comparably small volume, the Union’s budget often comes in for heavy criticism (see 
Mueller 1997; Sapir et al. 2004; Alesina, Angeloni, Schuknecht 2005). A major strand of critique 
focuses on the tasks for which the Union spends its money. More speciﬁ cally, it is argued that, on 
the one hand, the EU spends resources on policies which could and should be better dealt with 
by the national governments, such as on many agricultural issues. On the other hand, the EU 
budget does not devote any, or only very little, resources to issues for which the Union, according 
to many economists, should have more responsibilities (e.g. border controls).
Against this background, a fundamental question concerning the future development of the EU 
budget will be for which policy functions the European level should have responsibility. In this respect, 
European added value (EAV) plays a central role. According to the Commission, “an indispensable 
litmus test for any EU system of ﬁ nances is its ability to demonstrate that spending at the European 
level offers extra advantages compared to what can be achieved through national programmes, or, in 
other words, brings with it a ‘European value added’” (European Commission 2011:8).
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Crucial questions are how EAV can be shown, measured, and calculated. This analysis looks at 
this problem from a narrow and simple ﬁ scal federalism perspective. 
Fiscal federalism, European public goods, and EAV
A notion of a possible ‘added value of the European budget’ relates to the idea that ﬁ nancial 
resources that are spent at the EU level in total deliver higher beneﬁ ts compared to the same 
amount of resources spent at national or regional level. From a traditional ﬁ scal federalism 
perspective, this corresponds to the problem of an identiﬁ cation of those policies that are 
performed best by assigning responsibilities to the highest level of centralisation, i.e. at the 
European level.1 
Economic research on EAV has regularly used ﬁ scal federalism as a guiding principle to 
derive an optimal allocation of policy competences among different tiers of government in 
a federation. The theory of ﬁ scal federalism does not necessary assume the existence of a 
federation in a political sense.2 In the context of this approach, which is based on pioneering 
work by Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972), the optimal political-decision level for each policy 
area can be identiﬁ ed by cost-beneﬁ t considerations. The notion is that centralisation and 
decentralisation have speciﬁ c advantages and drawbacks that differ from policy to policy. Set-
ting relative beneﬁ ts and costs of (de)centralisation of responsibilities against each other will 
yield an appropriate allocation of responsibilities to the different territorial authorities along 
the lines of the principle of subsidiarity. The normative choice between European, national, 
regional, and local level responsibilities is essentially a trade-off between costs and beneﬁ ts 
of centralisation.
The approach is based on the fundamental notion of ‘ﬁ scal equivalence’ (Olson, 1969). Accord-
ing to this basic principle, state structures should be designed such that for each public good 
provided by government authorities, the group of beneﬁ ciaries, decision-makers, and taxpay-
ers coincides. If responsibilities for public goods provision are assigned accordingly (‘perfect 
matching’), cross-border externalities are absent and public goods will be provided efﬁ ciently.
Several authors thus conclude that the EU level should be responsible for the provision of 
‘European public goods’, that are available jointly and non-rival for all EU-residents (but not 
outside the EU) (e.g. ECORYS et al. 2008; Collignon 2011). A number of goods/policies that 
appear to have European-wide beneﬁ ts clearly come to mind. Among them are, to name but a 
few (ECORYS et al. 2008; Collignon 2011):
1  At least if we rule out or neglect the possibility that for some policies global solutions might be even more preferable.
2  I shall not discuss here whether the theory of fiscal federalism is adequate for an analysis of EU topics. See e.g. Begg (2009).
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· border control;
· defence policies;
· internal security;
· market regulation and guarantees of fundamental economic freedoms;
· trade and competition policies;
· environmental issues, climate protection and energy policy;
· (fundamental) R&D and education policies;
· macroeconomic stabilisation policies.
It seems that European integration itself has created new European public goods that can only be 
provided efﬁ ciently at the European level. Reducing barriers to trade and migration, increased 
international mobility of physical, ﬁ nancial and human capital creates cross-border effects for 
example of national (sub-national) ﬁ scal or education policies and, according to this approach, 
should be handled at the EU-level.
In most of these cases, it might well be demonstrated that assigning expenditure responsibili-
ties to the EU-level can help member states save money. EAV can be generated if cost savings 
in national budgets exceed additional spending at the EU-level and the quality of the provided 
services is not reduced (Heinemann 2011).
I do not want to elaborate on the fundamental problems when measuring the quality (or quantity) 
of public service provision in general. Outputs and – even more important – outcomes from 
certain policy actions depend on numerous external factors, including the governance struc-
tures, other policies and other countries’ efforts. However, I will argue that this simpliﬁ ed line of 
reasoning, i.e. assigning policies to the European level just because their transnational beneﬁ ts 
causes EAV, neglects some central aspects of ﬁ scal federalism.
European-wide benefits and scale economies are not enough
In 1969, Gordon Tullock emphasised that the existence of cross-border spillovers does not necessar-
ily lead to optimal centralised solutions. Acknowledging that a 100-percent internalisation of exter-
nal effects would require a world government even for road cleaning, Tullock (1969) asks to which 
extent interregional spillovers should be internalized? Fifty percent, 80 percent, or 99 percent? A 
formal calculus of optimal federal structures (Tullock 1969, Oates 1972 and 1999 on federalism in 
general; Eller, Breuss 2004; Pitlik 2007; Heinemann, Mohl, Osterloh 2010) takes into account:
(1) factors that point towards centralisation of policy responsibilities, especially
· economies of scale (economies of scope);
· interregional (cross-border) spillovers.
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(2) factors that point towards decentralisation of responsibilities, in particular
· interregional preference heterogeneity and cost of information;
· interregional competition both as a driver of innovation and as a constraint;
 on national Leviathan governments.
The idea of the approach is illustrated in Figure 1. The horizontal axis depicts population size N 
of a geographical area. N2 is the total population of the area (say Europe). The curve B illustrates 
welfare losses in the population that arise because of non-internalised cross-border spillovers 
and unexploited scale economies in the provision of public goods. With an increasing number of 
individuals involved through a centralisation of responsibilities welfare losses are reduced. This 
however also comes at a cost. The solid (black) curve A1 shows welfare losses from centralisation 
due to a violation of preferences. The notion is that public outputs cannot be provided according 
the demands of the local population because of higher costs of acquiring the information or lack 
of competitive political pressure in a more centralised system. Put differently, these are the coun-
tervailing effects against centralisation. The theoretically optimal level of provision (jurisdiction 
size) is N1, where the sum of welfare losses (A1+B) is minimised. 
0
0
Cost
A1+B
A2+B
A2
N2N1
A1
B
N
Figure 1: Optimal degree of (de)centralisation
Source: Own illustration
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Centralisation of responsibilities is an optimal solution if the welfare losses are minimised at N2. 
This is the case if the beneﬁ ts from centralisation are substantial and/or the welfare losses from 
a centralisation are comparably small, as depicted by the dotted blue line A2 and the correspond-
ing added A2+B-curve.
Only if the beneﬁ ts of centralisation outweigh its cost, allocation of certain policy tasks towards 
a higher governmental level is justiﬁ ed (centralisation). And the allocation of competences to 
the European level requires that the expected beneﬁ ts of centralisation are far higher than 
expected costs.
This simple consideration highlights an often neglected point in the debate about EAV and the 
proper role of the EU. Form an economic point of view, it is not enough to simply identify policies 
that have the characteristics of a European public good with a beneﬁ t region that is corresponding to 
the entire Union area and substantial economies of scale in consumption. Only if we additionally 
assume that potential welfare losses due to preference violation from centralised supply are compa-
rably small (or even negligible) an added value from EU responsibility can reasonably be expected.
Calculating European added value requires a measure 
for preference violation at the national level
In an ever-enlarging Union, preference heterogeneity among European citizens is probably not to 
be neglected. Eurobarometer surveys and opinion polls constantly show considerable differences 
in policy preferences among citizens of different nations, even with respect to many policies 
for which the term European public goods appears to suit best (e.g. common defence policies). 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) argue that the EU already has ‘gone too far’ in centralisation given 
the existing preference heterogeneities among European taxpayers and consumers.
Mueller (2008) lists a number of potential sources of preference heterogeneities with respect to 
the desired level and quality of public goods provision:
· simple taste differences
· income differences
· ideology
· geography
· religion
· ethnics
· culture
· language.
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Begg (2009), for example, ﬁ nds that defence or foreign policies show the classic characteristics of 
European public goods which make them candidates for EU-responsibilities. Nevertheless, both 
policy areas are at the core of what member states usually stand for (as do social policies). Hence, 
“the EU cannot expect to intrude in these areas just because economies of scale might make it 
more effective in delivering policy”.
All of these factors probably impact the utility individuals derive from different levels of public 
goods provision. As Mueller states: “If the continual expansion of the EU leads to continually 
greater degrees of heterogeneity across the EU in citizen preferences (tastes) for EU-wide public 
goods, expansion is likely to erode the perceived beneﬁ ts from the EU of citizens in member 
countries, unless these costs are offset by other beneﬁ ts from expansion”.
The central problem is then how to measure disutility from preference violations if public goods 
are provided to a different than desired level, as many of the welfare losses incurred due to 
preference heterogeneity are not ‘real’, but psychological costs.
EU economic governance of public 
goods provision has an effect on EAV
A further aspect that should be emphasised with respect to the measurement of EAV is that the 
beneﬁ ts and cost of policies depend on the institutional structures of provision. This can easily be 
seen for the heterogeneity issue discussed above. The implicit assumption of preference violation 
through centralised provision is that of a ‘rigid union’, with an externally imposed restriction 
for the central level to provide uniform policy across countries (Alesina, Angeloni, Etro 2005). 
Several institutional arrangements in more ﬂ exible unions may offer an opportunity to deliver 
regionally differentiated policies which are better adapted to local preferences as alternatives to 
full delegation (see also the subsidiarity test by Pelkmans 2006): 3 
· shared responsibilities;
· matching grants (e.g. supplementary EU spending alongside national spending);
· enhanced cooperation.
In many cases, it is possible to decide centrally on geographically differentiated levels of public 
goods in line with the diverse regional preferences and cultures. These arrangements might 
be suitable to reduce the welfare losses from preference violations. Note, however, that more 
complex forms of organisation of a ﬁ scal federalism do not come without additional costs, which 
impact the added value of European provision. For example, regional differentiation opens up 
3  Indeed, in many cases the EU appears to be simply an agent for the member states, rather than an autonomous tier of government (Begg 2009).
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the political realm to redistribution games among nations to obtain a larger share of EU spend-
ing (Dur, Roelfsmaa 2005). To make things even more complicated, the effects of certain EU 
policies (e.g. structural funds) seem to depend strongly on institutional quality at the national 
(recipient) level.
Hence, making EAV an operational concept would also require taking into account the effects 
of different types of EU governance, ranging from delegation and coordination to national 
autonomy. This not a novel point. Fiscal federalism implicitly assumes frictions of central level 
governments when trying to gather correct information on regional preferences (Pitlik 1997). 
Political economics has shown that these frictions are the result of institutional arrangements of 
collective decision making.
Preliminary conclusion
The concept of value added is of utmost importance in determining the future proper role of 
the EU. An attempt to estimate and gauge the EAV and to provide a quantitative framework for 
measurement will be a substantial step in the right direction. Such an attempt can be based on 
ﬁ scal federalism.
The theory of ﬁ scal federalism yet sometimes appears to be at best a heuristic and inexact method 
of calculating the suitable assignment of policies and the proper governmental level of provision. 
But, if we take the concept of EAV seriously, it is important not to overlook the well-being effects 
on the national level stemming from preference violations. Unfortunately, these appear to be 
much more difﬁ cult to account for than the calculation of pure budgetary effects.
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Robert Schwager
Negotiations on the multiannual ﬁ nancial framework 2014-2020 once again sparked debate 
about the adequacy of the European budget: Is spending by the European Union (EU) too small, 
too large, or just right? In addition to the general amount of ﬁ scal resources transferred from the 
member states to the EU, European leaders had to decide which policy ﬁ elds should obtain higher, 
and which ﬁ elds should obtain lower funds in the EU budget. The research project of the Bertels-
mann Stiftung conducted together with the ZEW tackles this issue under the label ’European 
added value’. This input addresses two basic questions related to this concept:
1. What is European added value?
2. How can European added value be measured? 
In economic terms, European added value refers to the optimal degree of centralisation in 
Europe, a topic which is addressed by the theory of ﬁ scal federalism. Among the various consid-
erations put forward by this strand of research, the concept of economies of scale traditionally 
takes a prominent role. For this reason, this essay aims at clarifying this concept and its empiri-
cal content. Speciﬁ cally, it relates economies of scale to the theory of public goods, and points 
out a fundamental problem arising in any attempt to quantify economies of scale in the public 
sector. It will then discuss three possible solutions to this problem, and conclude by comparing 
the merits of these solutions. 
Economies of 
Scale in the Public 
Sector: Concept 
and Measurement
of EAV
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Economies of scale and European public goods
In the public sector, economies of scale arise when larger jurisdictions can provide a public good 
at lower cost than smaller jurisdictions. To deﬁ ne the concept formally, let g be the quality pro-
vided by some public service such as roads or higher education. Furthermore, denote by n1 and 
n2 the numbers of inhabitants of two jurisdictions 1 and 2, say member states of the EU, and by 
C(g,n) the cost of providing g units of the public good to n users. With this notation, economies of 
scale are present if C(g,n1+n2) < C(g,n1) + C(g,n2). Thus, if the two jurisdictions provide the public 
service jointly, say by transferring responsibility for it to the EU, the total cost is reduced com-
pared to a separate provision. The European added value of European spending then is quantiﬁ ed 
by the cost saved compared to spending by the member states: C(g,n1) + C(g,n2) – C(g,n1+n2).
In the language of the theory of public goods, this cost saving by centralisation arises from a 
partial or complete lack of rivalness in the consumption of the public good. Given that the public 
service is provided to the n1 inhabitants of the ﬁ rst member state, adding the n2 additional users 
from the second member state requires a less than proportional increase in expenditures, even 
if the service quality g available for all users is kept constant. Equivalently, the per-capita cost of 
providing a public good c(g,n) = C(g,n)/n decrease in the number of users. If a public good satis-
ﬁ es this property at population numbers n corresponding roughly to the number of inhabitants of 
the larger member states, it satisﬁ es the criterion of (partial) non-rivalness at the European level, 
and thus one may call it a European public good.
This simple formulation is the basis of empirical research aiming at detecting and quantifying 
economies of scale in the public sector. Using data on the expenditures on some public function, 
or the public budget as a whole, for jurisdictions of variable population size, one can regress per-
capita spending on the number of inhabitants. The regression coefﬁ cient then describes ∂c/∂n, 
the partial derivative of per capita cost with respect to population size. If the coefﬁ cient is nega-
tive, then economies of scale are present and a centralisation of this task induces cost savings. 
Quite obviously, however, this immediate conclusion is only justiﬁ ed if the service quality pro-
vided is identical across the jurisdictions in the sample. Otherwise, low expenditures in, say, 
large states may simply reﬂ ect a poor level of public goods rather than genuine cost savings. 
Conversely, high expenditures in large jurisdictions may not necessarily contradict the presence 
of economies of scale. Rather, such expenditures may simply be the consequence of high ﬁ scal 
revenues per capita, which in turn may be caused by a strong tax base or by favourable treatment 
of large jurisdictions in a ﬁ scal equalization scheme. 
Figure 1 illustrates this. There, population size and per capita expenditures of two jurisdictions 
are displayed. It is assumed that the larger jurisdiction provides a higher service level than 
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the smaller one (n2>n1 and g2>g1). The true per capita cost functions are given by the solid black 
lines. These slope downwards, so that there are indeed economies of scale. Since jurisdiction 2 
provides a better service level, its curve, labelled c(g2,n), is located above the curve for jurisdic-
tion 1, labelled c(g1,n). As shown in the ﬁ gure, it is therefore well possible that, in spite of its 
larger population, jurisdiction 2 spends more per capita than the smaller jurisdiction 1 (c(g2,n2)> 
c(g1,n1)). If one now ignores the difference in service levels provided, one derives from this obser-
vation that the relationship between size and per capita cost is increasing, as illustrated by the 
dashed red regression line.
There is a strong theoretical reason why the presence of economies of scale may actually induce 
per-capita expenditures to rise rather than decrease in population size. Economies of scale mean 
that the tax per capita required to ﬁ nance a public good is decreasing with increasing population 
size. Rationally, then, larger jurisdictions will provide a higher quality of the public good than 
smaller ones, and, if demand for this public service is sufﬁ ciently price-elastic, they will incur 
Figure 1: Population size and expenditures for public goods. g1 < g2.
Source: Own illustration
0
0
Per capita 
expenditures 
c(g2,n2)
c(g1,n1) c(g2,n)
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higher expenditures than smaller jurisdictions (see Büttner and Holm-Hadulla 2013). In the most 
extreme case, some public goods may not be provided at all by smaller jurisdictions because 
they are too costly (Oates 1989), yielding zero expenditures in small, but potentially very high 
expenditures in large jurisdictions.
Formally, the effect of population size on the level of public good demanded can be integrated in 
the cost function by assuming a demand function g(n) which depends on population size. Then, 
per capita cost is c(g(n),n), and an increase in population changes the per capita cost according to 
the total derivative (∂c/∂g) (∂g/∂n)+∂c/∂n. In a regression that does not take the service level into 
account, the coefﬁ cient of population thus gives the combined effect that population exerts directly 
on the per capita cost (the second term) and indirectly via a change in demand (the ﬁ rst term). Spe-
ciﬁ cally, if the demand reaction is strong, one will ﬁ nd a positive effect of population on per capita 
expenditures, as illustrated in Figure 1, falsely concluding that there are diseconomies of scale.
Empirical approaches
Identical service quality across jurisdictions: In order to deal with this issue, three solutions 
come to mind. The ﬁ rst consists of essentially ignoring the problem by assuming that the ser-
vice level g is identical across jurisdictions. While this assumption of course seems odd after 
what was argued above, for some public activities, it might actually not be too far off the mark. 
Speciﬁ cally, spending on agricultural policy is likely to be a pure rent ﬂ owing to farmers, and 
so probably does not provide much of a beneﬁ t to citizens; that is, g ≈ 0 in all countries. Hence, 
the interesting issue is simply to ﬁ nd out whether a decentralized or a centralized responsi-
bility minimizes expenditures, and comparing expenditure levels across nations of different 
sizes may be perfectly sufﬁ cient to assess a potential value added of European responsibility 
in this policy area.
Indicators: A second solution aims at controlling for the service level provided by the various 
jurisdictions by adding a measure of g as an additional explanatory variable. Taking transpor-
tation, security, and education as examples, such indicators could be the length of the roads, 
the number of policemen, or the number of pupils in a jurisdiction (see Büttner, Schwager, and 
Stegarescu 2004). The beneﬁ t of using such variables, which mostly measure the quantity of 
some input used to provide the public good in question, is that data are usually easily avail-
able. On the downside, such input indicators are clearly very rough measures of what the 
government delivers. Speciﬁ cally, the quality of the public service is not taken into account: 
The length of the roads does not say anything about their state of maintenance; policemen in 
different jurisdictions may have different qualiﬁ cations; and schooling many children is of 
little use if the teaching is mediocre. 
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Preferably, one therefore should look for indicators that more directly try to measure the output 
of the production of public services. As mentioned by Hanushek (2002: 2046), education is a rare 
ﬁ eld of public spending where such an output indicator is available – in the form of the results 
of standardized ability tests such as the PISA study administered by the OECD. In many other 
ﬁ elds, however, such output measures are difﬁ cult to conceive, let alone collect. For example, a 
low crime rate may be due to the quality of policing, or to a socially favoured environment, or 
even to the fact that policing is so bad that people do not bother to report crimes. Emphasizing the 
quality dimension, another kind of indicators is based on surveys asking citizens how satisﬁ ed 
they are with some public service in their jurisdiction. Answers to this question certainly give 
helpful feedback to local politicians and administrators. They are likely, however, to be as much 
determined by region-speciﬁ c levels of expectations as by the objective quality of the public ser-
vice provided. Thus, in many policy ﬁ elds it seems extremely difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd suitable indicators 
of the quality of public goods provided.
One might think that these difﬁ culties are just another example of the lack of good data which 
pervasively plagues empirical research in economics. Although more data are always helpful, 
this view stops short of recognizing that the difﬁ culty in measuring the output of a public good is 
of a conceptual nature (see Büttner, Enß, and Schwager 2009). Public service levels are unobserv-
able because of the very nature of public, or publicly provided, goods. A deﬁ ning characteristic 
of public goods is non-excludability, that is, it is technically impossible or too costly to prevent 
individuals who do not contribute to the ﬁ nancing of the good from using it. Conceptually distinct 
from, but similar to, public goods are publicly provided private goods such as schools or health 
care. Excluding non-contributors from using these goods would be technically and economically 
feasible, but is not practised for political reasons. 
For the issue at hand, however, the distinction between public and publicly provided goods is not 
important, since both categories share the key feature preventing a measurement of the quality 
of the good supplied. In both cases, no price is levied from citizens for using the good, and thus 
no information is revealed about the willingness to pay for it. Hence, an objective measure of the 
value produced by the public sector is not available. This stands in marked contrast to the output 
of a private ﬁ rm whose quality is measured by the price it fetches on the market. Thus the value 
of the ﬁ rm’s overall output is readily quantiﬁ ed by the revenues earned.
Taking this argument to the extreme, one cannot even know whether the kind of public service 
offered is at all beneﬁ cial for the citizens, since no individual purchase decision is ever taken. 
Thus, even where seemingly objective output indicators are available, it is not clear whether they 
really describe what is important to citizens. For example, it is not obvious that standardized 
tests in reading and mathematics measure everything that parents expect from schools. Rather, 
parents might be more concerned, say, with enhancing the social competencies, the self-esteem, 
or even the leisure, of their children.
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Modelling the demand for public goods: Given these difﬁ culties, the third approach to estimate 
economies of scale does not try to observe public service levels themselves. Instead, one con-
structs a model which explains the level of public goods provided in a jurisdiction, and uses the 
implications from this model to isolate the cost saving effect of larger populations (see Borcherd-
ing and Deacon 1972). Formally, if one has information on (∂c/∂g)·(∂g/∂n), one can subtract this 
quantity from the population coefﬁ cient estimated in a regression without controlling for the 
level of public good g so as to recover the direct cost effect. Obviously, given that no data on g 
are available, one cannot simply estimate the effects ∂c/∂g and ∂g/∂n. Rather, one has to add 
information about some determinant of cost or demand from a source which is independent of the 
estimation of the cost function. 
In order to illustrate this procedure, consider a simple example with the cost function C(g,n) = 
gnγ, so that per capita cost is c(g,n) = gnγ -1. Here, the interesting parameter is γ-1, the elasticity 
of per capita cost with respect to population. If γ-1<0 (γ-1>0), then there are economies (disec-
onomies) of scale in providing g to larger communities. The per capita tax price of a unit of g is 
denoted by p, and an iso-elastic demand function g = p-ε for the public good is assumed, where 
ε>0 is the (absolute value of the) constant price elasticity of demand. Efﬁ cient provision requires 
p = ∂c/∂g, hence p = nγ -1, and inserting this in the demand function g = p-ε yields demand as a func-
tion of population size, g(n) = nε (1-γ). This allows us to eliminate g from the cost function, leading 
to c(g(n),n)) = n(γ-1)(1-ε), or, taking logarithms, ln c = (γ-1)(1-ε) ln n. Thus, a logarithmic regression of 
per capita cost on population yields the coefﬁ cient (γ-1)(1-ε). 
This coefﬁ cient incorporates both the cost (γ-1) and the demand (ε) effects of population on 
expenditures. However, if one makes an assumption on ε, one can calculate the scale parameter 
γ-1. For example, assuming ε=0 implies that demand g is constant such that omitting the variable 
g does not bias the estimated coefﬁ cient. (This corresponds to the ﬁ rst approach for estimating 
economies of scale mentioned above.) Also, if one has good reason to believe that demand is very 
price-elastic, i.e., ε>1, then the estimated coefﬁ cient will have a different sign than the scale 
parameter γ-1. In this case, there is value added in centralizing the public function in question 
if larger jurisdictions have higher rather than lower expenditures compared to smaller ones. 
Finally, if one has a numerical value for ε, one can put a precise ﬁ gure on γ-1. In such a case one 
can even simulate the quantitative beneﬁ t from centralizing the provision of a public good at the 
European level. 
Where can information on ε be obtained, if one wants to substantiate it with observed data? Here, 
no general answer can be provided, but it is worth noting that the price elasticity of demand for 
public goods is but one example for this procedure. In general, any parameter that describes the 
impact of some variable on cost or demand may be used. Thus, the precise model at hand, and the 
nature of the public service studied, must be examined so as to come up with creative ideas. For 
example, in the case of publicly provided private goods, there may be close substitutes sold on 
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private markets where demand can be observed. Thus, a model estimating the revenues of pri-
vate schools may give indication on the price elasticity of the demand for education. As a second 
example, in the pioneering work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972), the identifying parameter 
is the production elasticity of labour in the technology producing the public good, which is cali-
brated to be the share of personnel expenditures in total government outlays.
Comparison of the approaches
Since there is no revealed preference for public goods, and therefore no theoretically convincing 
measure of the quality of public goods, all attempts at quantifying economies of scale in the 
public sector must necessarily remain imperfect. Nevertheless, all three approaches already dis-
cussed have their merit. First of all, it may well be that for some public goods, quality differences 
are minor. Also, from a purely ﬁ scal perspective, saving money by transferring functions to the 
European level might be the main goal, even if that goes in hand with a decrease in the quality 
of public services. Thus, in some cases, a pure comparison of expenditures across jurisdictions 
of different size will be informative, and the conclusion that larger jurisdictions spend less per 
capita may give a valid hint of a potential European added value. 
Nevertheless, an estimate of cost savings that controls, however imperfectly, for the level of 
public goods provided would generally be more convincing. Thus, while it is impossible to ﬁ nd 
theoretically ideal indicators of the quality of public services, it seems obvious that using some 
indicator can improve the quality of the estimation substantially. Speciﬁ cally, one should strive 
for variables that are as close as possible to the output of the public service studied, rather than 
relying on purely quantitative measures of the number of staff deployed or the number of indi-
viduals served. Returning to the example of standardized ability tests as an indicator of a school 
system s´ output, one has to acknowledge that the reservations formulated above are somewhat 
hyperbolic. If one were to show empirically that large (small) jurisdictions spend less on educa-
tion than small (large) ones while scoring at least as good in PISA tests, one would no doubt have 
gone a long way towards establishing a value added of centralizing (decentralizing) education.
The third approach, which consists of modelling the demand for public goods together with the 
cost of provision, appears to be more subtle than the use of indicators since it seems to circum-
vent the problem caused by the lack of an observable measure of public output. In essence, how-
ever, this approach just replaces information on the level of public service by information on some 
parameter determining this service level. Hence, whether such an approach is more convincing 
than using indicators to control directly for the level of public goods provided depends strongly 
on the plausibility of the underlying model, and the availability of reasonable conjectures about 
the identifying parameter. If such a convincing model can be formulated, it may yield results that 
are highly valuable both from a theoretical and a political perspective.
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